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Over the past few years, there has been a sustained interest in the development of small 
modular reactors (SMRs) evident by the number of global initiatives focused on SMR 
development. This desktop study was performed to review the viability of SMRs based on 
their benefits and flexibility, focusing predominantly on the light water NuScale and the gas 
cooled AHTR designs. In assessing the level of safety, the typical general design and safety 
criteria were reviewed to establish a basis to compare the NuScale and AHTR designs. The 
need for flexibility to support grid operators and the ability of a nuclear plant to load follow 
were reviewed to confirm their flexibility. The principal of cogeneration and the feasibility 
for cogeneration and energy storage with SMRs was explored to determine the potential 
industrial application. Finally, the technical readiness and uncertainties, the potential market 
and economic competitiveness of SMRs were reviewed. 
The review established that SMRs with safety performance levels exceeding those of current 
reactor designs are definitely viable. The ability to prevent fuel failure through passive 
cooling simplifies the design by eliminating the need for complex safety systems and 
reduces the constraints associated with siting, opening up energy markets where previously 
nuclear reactors would not have been viable. Their flexibility and the ability to add 
additional units over time enable them to integrate into any size electrical network and a 
variety of energy markets. As a clean energy source, SMRs are well suited to support 
strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and replace fossil-based energy sources. 
SMRs operating at high temperatures have the added option of considering thermal storage 
as a means to provide additional flexibility. 
The biggest uncertainty in the deployment of SMRs is associated with the regulatory and 
licencing processes. However, there is a large potential market for SMRs and the lower 
capital cost per unit, the shorter period until a revenue stream is established and the ability 
to stagger the financial impact of additional units are expected to make SMRs easier to 
finance than large nuclear units. This preliminary review concluded that SMRs are definitely 
viable, but until a SMR design has been successfully licenced, constructed and operated, the 
uncertainty associated with the licencing of a new technology and the potential for long 
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There has been an increase in global interest in small modular reactors due to their 
postulated benefits. Their smaller size and flexibility are claimed to be the solution for 
integration into networks with alternative energy sources, including those with high 
penetration of renewables, as they can be deployed either as a single module or in a multi-
module plant with suitable load following capabilities. 
By contrast, the generating capacity (electrical output) of commercial nuclear power plants 
has tended to increase over time. The capacity of the initial commercial nuclear power plant 
designs were less than 100 MWe (Calder Hall commissioned in 1956 was 49 MWe) but this 
escalated quickly and by the mid-1980s nuclear power plants were typically rated around 
1000 MWe, while the latest standard plant designs being built are significantly larger 
[IAEA, 2017]. This was not specific to a reactor type, but was evident across all the 
commercial nuclear reactor technologies. Some of the reactors that are currently being 
constructed around the world include the French EPR (1600 MWe), the Russian VVER 
(1200 MWe) and the Korean APR (1400 MWe).  
The increase in capacity was a natural economic response in what could be referred to as 
the classical centralised generation public utility era. The overnight capital cost per 
megawatt of installed capacity could be reduced for larger units, which together with the 
low primary energy cost for nuclear fuel resulted in lower marginal cost of electricity 
produced from larger nuclear plants. It was therefore more cost effective to build larger 
plants, which the large centralised utilities could afford, but the plants had to be operated 
with a high utilization factor to recover the significant capital investment required, often 
referred to as “base load” operation. This also resulted in the designs of most of the nuclear 
plants that are in service being focused and optimised for base load operation. 
This approach to constructing large nuclear power plants is still being followed in regions 
where there is either: a clear policy decision associated with energy security or greenhouse 
gas reduction, a specific national energy strategy; or a large unserved or growing demand 





Emirates and Turkey, which are examples of countries currently constructing large nuclear 
plants, either by the centralised generating utility or under a signed power purchase 
agreement. 
In other regions, the future of existing nuclear power plants is continuously being 
questioned. Unlike the Chernobyl accident that occurred in April 1986, there was a much 
larger international political reaction, driven by environmental concerns, following the 
Fukushima accident of March 2011. By May 2012, Japan had shut down all 54 nuclear 
power plants for safety assessments. Only nine had returned to service by December 2018 
[WNA, 2019], complying with the more stringent Japanese regulations that took effect after 
the Fukushima accident. In addition, Japan, in its latest Energy Plan, approved July 2018, 
has committed to target the percentage energy from nuclear to 20-22% in the 2030 energy 
mix [WNA, 2019]. Germany reversed its nuclear policy and announced in May 2011 that 
all German nuclear power plants will be shut down by 2022, seven of which were still in 
operation in 2018. As a result, Germany remains dependant on coal to generate a third of its 
energy and is off track in being able to meet its 2020 emission targets [Tamma, 2018]. 
France committed in July 2015 to transition their energy mix, reducing the contribution of 
nuclear from over 75% to 50% by 2025 [WNA, 2016]. French President Emmanuel Macron, 
who was elected on a program to reduce the country's reliance on nuclear, has since 
backtracked on this commitment, and is using the increase in carbon dioxide releases as the 
reason. Other governments are also being cautious about making firm commitments on the 
phase out or reduction of nuclear as an energy source [Tamma, 2018].  
In addition, the world focus on greenhouse gas reduction and their respective carbon 
footprints, has led to the significant deployment of renewables (primarily wind). Many 
governments introduced subsidies in various forms to incentivise this shift to renewable 
energy sources like wind and solar, while the benefit of nuclear as a zero carbon emitting 
energy source was generally ignored. These renewable sources are totally dependent on the 
weather patterns, making them “not-dispatchable” as they are not available to the system 
operator for maintaining the balance between generation and demand. As a result, additional 
flexible dispatchable generation sources are required to manage the intermittency of the 
renewable generators (such as hydro, gas, coal or nuclear) and /or forms of energy storage 





If renewables operated in a wholesale market without subsidised prices, their economic 
viability would be less obvious as the open market price for electricity would be lowest 
when all the renewables are operating. There is therefore definitely a threshold level of 
penetration of renewables that a network can accommodate, especially if they are paid 
subsidies, to ensure ongoing reliability and sustainability. This essentially is what happened 
in South Australia which ended up in prolonged power outages when their substantial wind 
generation capacity was unavailable due to unseasonal weather changes. The excessive 
wind generating capacity was driven by lucrative feed-in tariffs that over time resulted in 
the closure of most of the alternative flexible generation capacity due to financial non-
viability. The recovery has required the installation of significant flexible generation and 
storage options and has significantly driven up the price of electricity in the region. On 31 
May 2018, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance 
and National Energy Board issued a statement [NDRC, 2018] stopping subsidies for utility-
scale solar projects and reducing feed-in-tariffs [Baker J, 2018]. During July 2018 in Ontario 
Canada, the Conservative government stopped over 700 clean energy contracts that were in 
the early stages, in order to save the province’s ratepayers millions [Green Tech Media, 
2018]. 
Most nuclear power plants have traditionally been operated as baseload sources due to their 
high fixed costs and low variable costs. Adjustments to maintain the balance between 
generation and demand were left to other technologies, in most cases with lower fixed costs 
but generally much higher variable costs like gas plants (pumped storage and coal in the 
case of South Africa). This situation is no longer the norm and in many countries, the old 
traditional baseload plants are now required to be flexible to be able to change their output 
to compensate for variations in power demand and the availability of intermittent generating 
sources. In regions with intensive renewables generating resources, large nuclear plants are 
also at risk of becoming stranded, financially unviable assets due to the economics 
associated with not operating in baseload mode. Generally, there are no tariff adjustments 
for the benefit that large nuclear power plants actually provide associated with the reliability 
in supply, the lack of carbon emission and the ability to provide flexible capacity. This was 
evident following the US District of Columbia Capacity Auction held in May 2018 where 
policy makers in Ohio and Pennsylvania have been urged to take action to prevent the 





It is a general misconception that nuclear power plants are technically incapable of ramping 
and load following. In fact, most nuclear power plants were designed to have relatively fast 
ramp rates and the ability to operate at different power levels. However, besides the 
economic benefit, operating constantly at full power is simpler and less demanding on the 
fuel and plant equipment. The ramping and load following capabilities of a plant are 
typically determined by regulatory limits and requirements associated with the fuel and the 
design of the reactor core. France is an example where nuclear generating capacity 
contributes more that 70% of the installed capacity and load-following is actively performed 
by nuclear units which reduce their output on a daily basis to meet the load profile [Lokhov, 
2011, page 18]. It demonstrates that nuclear plants are able to operate through a range of 
their total capacity, though most of the older designs cannot operate for prolonged periods 
at low power without restrictions on the rate at which they can return to full power. This 
ability to reduce power and return back to original power in a short time frame is well suited 
for daily load following and integration with solar plants where the output varies on a daily 
basis but not for wind which can blow strongly for days. 
It would appear, therefore, that in regions striving to meet the world Sustainable 
Development Goal number 7 (affordable and clean energy), there is definitely a role for 
large baseload nuclear power plants with their high reliability, to replace aging fossil plants, 
especially as nuclear is the lowest carbon emitter of all the traditional dispatchable energy 
sources.  
In regions where there is high penetration of renewables, predominantly wind, there is a 
need for technologies that are more flexible over a longer time period, which according to 
the NEA is ideally suited to small modular nuclear power plants, as their advanced designs 
provide options for co-generation to improve their economics in these emerging markets 
[NEA, 2016, page 10]. 
However, although nuclear remains a very attractive clean energy source without carbon 
dioxide emissions, there remains significant opposition to nuclear in any form, which needs 
to be considered for all new nuclear projects. 
1.2 Small Modular Reactor Technology Trend  
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are characterised by their lower output, typically 300 MWe 





conditions and transported as a complete module to the site for installation, achieving the 
economic benefits of series production and short construction times [IAEA, 2018(a) page 
8], [NEA, 2016, page 9]. 
Over the past few years, there has been a sustained interest in the development of SMRs, 
evident by the number of global initiatives focused on their development. Advanced SMR 
designs are claimed to offer many advantages and cater for more diverse markets than those 
in which large nuclear power plants operate. Their smaller size makes them attractive for 
developing countries with small electrical grids and the supply can increased over time by 
adding additional units as the demand increases. Multi-module versions of SMRs can be 
considered comparable to large nuclear units by providing the same overall capacity and 
may offer the generating flexibility that energy markets with large amounts of renewable 
capacity require. They have the added potential to be economically competitive by 
constructing in a series approach taking advantage of their less complex design, shorter 
construction durations, the accelerated learning rates and the short time span within which 
the first units become operational. The number of companies and private investors showing 
an interest in SMRs indicates a shift from the traditional government (state owned utilities) 
indicating some form of entrepreneurial goal stemming from their potential economic 
benefit and the predicted demand. 
Globally there are more than 50 initiatives focused on SMR development, but only a handful 
of demonstration SMRs are under construction and about a dozen are likely to be deployable 
in the near term as their development is well advanced [IAEA, 2018(a)]. Although many of 
the concepts have not yet actually been finalised, they all can be classified into one of the 
following three generic types: light water reactors (PWR), liquid metal or molten salt 
reactors, and graphite moderated high temperature gas reactors. 
Light water SMRs are moderated and cooled by ordinary water and have the lowest 
technological risk as they are similar to the majority of nuclear reactors currently in 
operation. The proposed fuel assemblies, although different in size are similar to existing 
fuel designs so no major development of the fuel is required. Within this type there are two 
variations: those that have a more conventional approach with a pressure vessel and external 
steam generators (e.g. KLT - Russia, ACPR - China, and SMR-160 - US), and those with 
an integral design where the complete steam supply system is inside the reactor pressure 





Liquid metal or molten salt reactors are those cooled by a liquid metal or molten salt that is 
a solid at room temperatures but has high thermal conductivity and high boiling points such 
as sodium, lead-bismuth or a form of chloride or fluoride salt. The majority of these reactors 
do not have a moderator and operate on fast neutrons which makes them typically smaller 
and simpler that the light water variants. They typically have better fuel performance and 
can operate for longer periods between refuelling, although they require fuel enrichment 
between 15 to 20%, which is usually derived from blending down weapons grade plutonium 
or reprocessing used light water reactor fuel. There is a unique variant of the molten salt 
reactor type where the fuel is dissolved in the coolant (molten salt) and only reacts as it 
flows through the “core” which is designed with a moderator to enable the nuclear reaction 
to occur [IAEA, 2018(a), page 220]. All these SMRs have core outlet temperatures in excess 
of 500º C and operate at or near atmospheric pressure. Although historically there have been 
numerous research reactor prototypes of this type, a revised licencing framework and safety 
case approach is likely to be needed. Examples of SMR projects of this type include 
ThorCon (international consortium), the SVBR-100 (Russia) and the “Stable salt Reactor” 
(United Kingdom) while the IMSR (Canada) is a molten salt variant with the fuel dissolved 
in the coolant. 
As the name implies, graphite moderated high temperature gas reactors are designed with 
graphite as the moderator and an inert gas, typically helium, as the coolant. The fuel is in 
the form of TRISO (tri-structural isotropic) coated particles combined with graphite and 
silicon carbide into “pebbles” (balls) or “prism” blocks which are stable to over 1600º C. 
The capability of operating at high coolant gas outlet temperatures of up to 1000º C, 
provides the option of coupling the reactor directly to a Brayton cycle gas turbine generator 
set with possible efficiencies in excess of 50%. High temperature gas reactors have in the 
past been built and operated successfully for many years [Scheuermann et al, 2017, page 
13] such as Peach Bottom Unit 1 (Pennsylvania), a 115 MWt plant that operated from 1966 
to 1974 and Fort St Vrain (Colorado) a 842 MWt plant which operated from 1974 to 1989. 
Both were helium-cooled and used prism block fuel in the reactor. In Germany the AVR 
(Jülich) which operated from 1966 to 1988 at 46 MWt and the THTR300 (Schmehausen) 
which operated from 1983 to 1989 at 750 MWt, were also helium-cooled but used pebble 
fuel. Although there is a recent revival in interest, a revised licencing framework and safety 
case approach will be needed to address the desired higher temperatures. The HTR-PM (230 





considered by Eskom after shelving the PBMR design due to the inability to obtain a 
committed end user. 
There are clearly numerous different SMR designs, each with its own unique characteristics 
and associated advantages and challenges, but they all share similar concepts and claim to 
have the benefit of passive safety. The question remains whether the benefits and flexibility 
of small modular reactor designs make them viable. This paper examines this question, 
focusing predominantly on the strengths of SMRs because they have not been documented 
in the context of energy policies for countries like South Africa and to limit the scope of this 
minor dissertation.   
Two examples of SMR technologies have been chosen for comparison: the light water 
NuScale concept that is easily compared with a large PWR and the Eskom AHTR concept 
with increased peaking capability through the use of thermal energy storage. 
1.3 Key research questions 
Considering the background described above, the aim of the research addressed in this 
dissertation is to try and answer the questions on the viability of SMRs by exploring the 
following aspects: 
 Can the passive design features of SMRs result in an improved level of safety, what 
are the associated benefits and how does it impact the SMR design, licencing, and 
costs? 
 What are the implications and constraints on the fuel and reactor core associated with 
load follow operation? 
 Are there viable co-generation options for SMRs and is thermal storage a viable 
consideration? 
 What are the technological uncertainties and economic considerations associated with 
SMRs? 
1.4 Research methodology and structure of the dissertation 
The research was a desktop study that entailed the identification and analysis of relevant 





chapter one providing the background to the key research questions and the framework of 
the report. A separate chapter is then dedicated to each of the main research questions. The 
criteria on which the comparison is performed are identified throughout the text and 
included in brackets, for example {Safety Function 2.1}. 
Chapter two outlines the typical internationally accepted approach required to demonstrate 
safety of a Nuclear Power Plant, and defines the requirements against which a comparison 
of the NuScale and AHTR designs is performed. This chapter also explores the unique 
features of the NuScale and AHTR designs, the associated safety benefits, and concludes 
that both concepts, based on the currently available information, can be considered credible 
designs with enhanced passive safety features. 
Chapter three provides an overview of the load following requirements, the impact that 
load following has on the nuclear reactor, the design features and operational controls that 
are applied. It concludes that modern reactor designs can provide large operational 
flexibility. The level of flexibility required by a system operator can have a significant 
impact on the load factor of the reactor. Alternate means of co-generation to enable the 
reactor to operate at a higher load factor can improve the financial viability of SMRs. 
Chapter four explores the feasibility of cogeneration as a means to improve the economic 
viability of a SMR by supplying both electricity and thermal energy for industrial 
applications. The literature search identified reports and technical assessments that 
demonstrate the feasibility of SMRs to cogenerate process steam to compensate for the 
variability in the electrical output demanded by the grid. The practicality of cogeneration is 
specific to each application, but certain conditions must be present. These include the 
existence of a market for both products, the ability to co-site the nuclear and industrial 
facilities, the compatibility of the life-spans of both facilities and the impact of the 
variability of each product on the production of the other. One of the more complex issues 
is the number of stakeholders involved (Regulator, Plant Operator, System Operator, 
Process steam user, etc.). The AHTR concept of storing excess thermal energy that is later 
used to generate electricity has unique advantages as it has the potential to maximise the 
reactor load factor and its flexibility for the system operator, but it must still be demonstrated 





Chapter five reviews the technological uncertainties and the economic viability of SMRs. 
The literature indicates a large potential market for SMRs and there does not appear to be 
any technological barriers for the NuScale and HTGR concepts. There would appear to be 
an upper temperature limit of around 1000o C for HTGR designs, which could influence the 
AHTR concept. The future of small modular reactors will ultimately be determined by 
market competition and the successful licencing and operation of FOAK plants. 
The smaller unit size, the significantly fewer components, and the shorter construction 
period of SMRs will reduce the overnight capital costs required per unit if compared with a 
large conventional nuclear unit. This lower capital cost together with the shorter period until 
a revenue stream is established and the ability to stagger the financial impact of additional 
units is expected to make both individual SMRs and multi-unit SMR sites easier to finance 
than large nuclear units. 
However, most parties are cautious about being the first to invest in a first-of-a-kind 
technology, and want them to be built and tested elsewhere. Until a SMR design has been 
successfully licenced, constructed and operated, the uncertainty associated with the 
licencing of a new technology and the potential for long delays is likely to prevent any large-
scale deployment in the near future. 
Chapter six discusses the results of the previous chapters and draws the conclusion that 
SMRs are definitely viable. They have safety performance levels far exceeding those of 
current reactor designs. Their flexibility and the ability to add additional units over time, 
enables them to integrate into any size electrical network and a variety of energy markets. 
In addition, as a clean energy source SMRs are also well suited to support strategies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although this is only a preliminary review, and further 
study and assessment is warranted, it concludes that the benefits associated with SMRs, 
should have an important role to play in the future of nuclear energy. The actual deployment 
of any SMR design will however rely on the successful licencing, construction and 








DESIGN SAFETY FEATURES OF SMALL MODULAR REACTORS 
In this chapter, the typical general design criteria for safety are reviewed and the safety 
features of the NuScale and AHTR concepts are assessed, leading to a comparison of each 
in terms of the general design criteria.  
2.1 Review of the typical Regulatory Safety Criteria  
The regulatory safety requirements governing the design and operation of nuclear reactors 
have always focused on the ability through safety analysis to demonstrate the overall safety 
of a plant and provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated without undue 
risk to the health and safety of the public. This requires the operator to demonstrate through 
analysis that the associated safety criteria for all anticipated plant conditions based on their 
frequency of occurrence and consequence, are respected. 
The American National Standard Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary 
Pressurised Water Reactor Plants [ANSI, 1973, page 2] expanded on the General Design 
criteria for PWRs and defined four categories of occurrences that can be summarised as: 
 Condition I - Normal Operation: Occurrences that are anticipated to occur regularly 
during plant operation, which the plant must accommodate without the need for 
automatic or manual protective action. 
 Condition II - Incidents of Moderate Frequency: Occurrences that are not anticipated 
to occur more than once a year, which the plant must be designed to tolerate, by 
shutting down if necessary, and being capable of returning to service. 
 Condition III - Infrequent Incidents: Occurrences that could occur during the life of a 
plant. If they occur, the plant design must limit the damage to a small fraction of the 
fuel elements, and with no impact on the surrounding area. 
 Condition IV - Limiting Faults: Occurrences that are not expected to occur, but are 
considered due to the potential significance of their occurrence.  The plant response 






The analysis of Condition I occurrences demonstrates that a plant can operate with the 
defined flexibility without challenging any protection set points. The analysis of Condition 
II and III occurrences verifies the design assumptions for the reactor protection system 
including the appropriateness of the set point values. The analysis of Condition IV 
occurrences, the most drastic conditions that must be designed against, represent the limiting 
design case and they verify the design of the required safeguard systems. 
The roles of the required safeguard systems [Rasmussen, 1975, page 25] are to perform the 
following Safety Functions (SF): 
 Reactor Trip: to stop the fission process, terminating additional heat input. {SF 2.1 - 
Control of reactivity} 
 Emergency Core Cooling: to cool the core, thereby maintaining the core geometry and 
keeping the release of radioactive material from the fuel to low levels. {SF 2.2 - 
Control of heat removal} 
 Containment Integrity: to reduce the radioactivity released from the fuel into the 
containment and prevent the radioactivity within the containment from being 
dispersed into the environment. {SF 2.3 - Control / containment of radioactive 
material} 
The likelihood of a reactor vessel failure is considered negligible due to the high quality 
requirements applied during the design, manufacture and operation. However, due to the 
severity of the consequences of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) from a leak 
or break in the primary circuit piping external to the reactor vessel, the US general design 
criteria included a specific requirement [US NRC, 2019, section 46] that light-water reactors 
plant designs using uranium oxide fuel contained within cylindrical zircaloy cladding must 
include an emergency core cooling system (ECCS). In the late 1970s when these 
requirements were originally defined, it was generally accepted that an ECCS was necessary 
to minimise fuel failure and to avoid fuel dispersion in order to minimise the radiological 
risk to the public. This resulted in specific performance criteria for the emergency core 
cooling system response. It also specified criteria that can be considered an additional safety 
function associated with the maximum amount of cladding oxidization and hydrogen 
generation from the chemical reaction of the cladding with water or steam {SF 2.4 - Control 





Although the regulatory environments differ between countries, most countries adopted the 
approach developed in the US by the American Energy Corporation (now called the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission) in 1973 [NEA, 2003, page 45]. In order to demonstrate adequate 
safety and to comply with the general design requirements [US NRC, 2019, Appendix A] 
and the internationally recommended acceptance criteria [IAEA, 2003, Page 8], reactor 
designs had to include many redundant safety systems, including:  
 Redundant systems to ensure emergency core cooling {Design Requirement (DR) 2.1 
- Redundant safety and safeguard systems}; 
 A containment building to contain the possible release of all the energy stored in the 
plant systems and to limit the spread of radioactive material {DR 2.2 - Containment 
building};  
 Redundant onsite backup electrical systems as the safeguard systems required 
electrical power to operate {DR 2.3 - Redundant on-site Ac power sources};  
 Measures to address all the natural phenomena and environmental conditions 
associated with the site {DR 2.4 - External hazards}.  
This deterministic approach is well defined in specific design codes and standards and 
encouraged through the industry guidance on Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants 
[IAEA, 2009].  
The IAEA recommended target core damage frequency {DR 2.5 – Probabilistic risk 
frequencies} for existing nuclear power plants is a frequency of occurrence of severe core 
damage that is below 10E–4 events per plant operating year and for future plants a goal of 
not more than 10E–5 severe core damage events per plant operating year [IAEA, 1999, page 
11]. The definition of what constituted core damage differs considerably with reactor 
technology. For example for light-water nuclear power reactors core damage is defined as 
a local fuel temperature above 1204º C, the acceptance criteria for the ECCS operation [US 
NRC, 2019, Section 46 1b]. Others have more general definitions such as prolonged core 
uncover or long-term cooling. The limits associated with core damage event frequency 
required by different regulators vary between 10E-4 and 10E-6 per year {DR 2.5a} but the 
requirements for new plants are consistently stricter than for existing ones, and the use of a 
probabilistic risk (safety) assessment is becoming mandatory as opposed to indicative 
[SSM, 2011, page 23]. Similarly, the regulatory targets for the probability of a large early 





The Fukushima Daiichi accident demonstrated the need for reliable safety system 
performance for extended periods of time, especially residual heat removal, and the need to 
prevent off-site releases once fuel failure has occurred. It also resulted in the “Design 
Extension Condition” concept further improving the safety of nuclear plants by considering 
additional postulated accident conditions and multiple equipment failures that are not 
considered as part of the design basis [IAEA, 2016, page 24]. These requirements are in 
principle addressed through the established design safety requirements, but emphasise the 
importance of the long-term availability of the safety and safeguard systems {DR 2.6 – 
Assured long term cooling}. 
Due to the unique characteristics associated with most SMR designs, the licencing and 
certification of the SMR design will have to justify the ability of the plant to meet the 
generally accepted safety functions and safety requirements, and where necessary, justify 
new methodologies and appropriate acceptance criteria. 
2.2 Typical Operational and Design Criteria 
The design of a nuclear power plant must ensure the ability to remove the thermal energy 
(heat) generated within the fuel during the fission process. The thermal energy is transferred 
to the coolant as it circulates through the reactor core, resulting in a temperature increase in 
the coolant. A temperature gradient from the centre of the fuel through the fuel cladding and 
to the cooling medium is required for the transfer to occur. This results in a temperature 
profile within the fuel rods, with the fuel centre experiencing the highest temperature. The 
main contributors to the resultant fuel temperature are the amount of heat being generated 
in the fuel, the ability of the coolant to remove the heat and the thermal conductivity of the 
fuel and the cladding material. If the fuel temperature exceeds the fuel melting temperature 
or the cladding material exceeds its temperature limits, fuel failure can occur providing a 
pathway for fission products to be released from the fuel. The amount of failed fuel rods, 
referred to as the failed fuel fraction [DR 2.7 - Fuel failure fraction}, defines the inventory 
of gaseous and solid fission products that could be released to the environment.   
If the coolant does not remove all the heat generated in the core, the temperature of the fuel 
and the cladding will rise. In a PWR when inadequate cooling occurs, a water/steam mixture 
forms within the coolant. The mixing produced by the steam bubbles in the coolant initially 





coalesce forming a continuous steam film against the cladding that severely decreases the 
heat transfer capability. This departure from nucleate boiling can occur anywhere in the core 
as the amount of heat produced by the fuel varies both radially and axially throughout the 
core in relation to the flux shape [Olander, 2009]. 
The radial flux profile can vary significantly due to the influence that the enrichment, burnup 
history and location of each individual fuel rod in the core can have on the power that a rod 
produces [IAEA, 2005, page 46]. In the axial direction, the coolant flow subjects the fuel 
rods to a temperature gradient along their length, influencing the temperature related 
reactivity coefficients and the power being produced. In addition, the position of the control 
rods can significantly alter the radial and axial flux shapes due to their high neutron 
absorbing characteristics. 
The safety analysis of the reactor core must demonstrate that the design criteria associated 
with fuel integrity for the different categories of occurrences are respected throughout the 
reactor core [ANSI, 1973]. Many of the inputs to the safety analysis involve fuel and reactor 
operating parameters that vary over time. As a result, the input assumptions that are used in 
the safety analysis are translated into Operational Requirements that must either be validated 
during the design of the core for each operating cycle, or be physical operational limitations 
to ensure the plant is always operated within the design and the safety analysis. 
Condition 1 and II occurrences must not result in any damage to the fuel cladding [ASME, 
1973, page3]. To demonstrate this the reactor coolant system must be able to prevent the 
CHF being reached anywhere in the core, with sufficient margin. The margin associated 
with the CHF is calculated on local conditions and is expressed as the departure from 
nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR). DNBR is the ratio of the heat flux needed to cause departure 
from nucleate boiling to the actual local heat flux of a fuel rod at a specific location. In order 
to achieve this, core design limits are established for overall core power, the maximum 
variation in local power distribution and the minimum DNBR [IAEA, 2005]. The local 
power distribution or peaking limits are expressed as limits on total heat flux and enthalpy 
rise: 
 The heat flux hot channel factor (FQ) is the ratio of maximum localised heat flux on 
the surface of a fuel rod anywhere in the core to the average heat flux of all the rods 





 The enthalpy rise hot channel factor, (FdH) is the ratio of power generated by the rod 
producing the most power anywhere in the core to the average power generated by all 
the rods in the core. 
Based on the above, to prevent fuel damage and plant operation outside the configuration 
defined by the safety analysis assumptions, Operational Requirements for a PWR include 
the position of the control rods {OR 2.1 - Control rod insertion limits}, the neutron flux 
shape {OR 2.2 - Axial flux profile}, fuel peaking limits {OR 2.3 - Peaking limits} and a 
minimum DNBR ratio {OR 2.4 - DNBR limit}. 
Condition III and IV occurrences can result in a limited amount of fuel damage. For 
condition III occurrences no more that 5% of the fuel rods can exceed the DNBR limit, all 
the cladding must respect the fuel rod cladding temperature limit and no fuel can exceed the 
fuel centreline melting temperature. For Condition IV occurrences (non-LOCA), up to 10% 
of the fuel rods can exceed the DNBR limit, all the cladding must respect the fuel rod 
cladding temperature limit, and 10% of the fuel by volume can exceed the fuel centreline 
melting temperature. These criteria prevent fuel cladding embrittlement and substantial 
volumetric changes of the fuel [Westinghouse, 1975, page 1-5]. The temperature at the 
centre of the fuel pellet at which fuel melting is assumed to occur is above 2644o C {OR 2.5 
- Fuel centre line temperature limit} and  the peak fuel rod cladding temperature limit {OR 
2.6a - Peak cladding temperature - non LOCA} is typically 1480o C (2700o F) [IAEA 2003, 
page 8].  
The assessment of a LOCA for light water reactors (i.e. PWRs and BWRs) using fuel with 
zircaloy cladding must ensure the most severe postulated occurrence is analysed. In a PWR 
this involves a double-ended guillotine break of a primary coolant pipe between the reactor 
vessel and one of the main circulating pumps. The evolution of this LOCA (PWR) and the 
impact on the fuel [NEA, 2009, page 43] can be summarised as follows. Almost 
immediately after of the break occurs, departure from nucleate boiling occurs as the coolant 
is expelled from the reactor vessel. As the coolant is also the moderator, the loss of water 
from the core adds negative reactivity that rapidly shuts down the nuclear reaction. This 
initial blow down phase can last up to 30 seconds, until the interactions between the primary 
circuit pumps, the high pressure safety injection system, the accumulators and the break 
dynamics result in some water starting to re-enter the lower part of the reactor vessel. With 





up. During the refill period, while the lower part of the reactor vessel is filling with water, 
the decay heat being generated within the fuel causes the fuel to heat up in an adiabatic 
mode as there is no meaningful heat removal mechanism. The re-flood period starts after 
about 40 seconds from the time of the break when the core begins to fill from the bottom 
due to the accumulation of the water injected into the reactor. As the water level rises, the 
fuel rods are quenched from the bottom up. This generates a two-phase mixture and the 
rising steam provides cooling to the fuel rod surface area above the quench front. Eventually 
there is enough cooling to prevent further increase in cladding temperature, and the Peak 
Cladding Temperature (PCT) is reached. From here on, the temperature will continue to 
decrease as long as cooling capable of removing the decay heat is maintained. 
During LOCA conditions other mechanisms can lead to fuel failure rate [NEA, 2009, page 
31 and 33]. Cladding embrittlement can occur due to hydrogen pickup leading to cladding 
failure or fragmentation due to the stresses induced during the quenching phase. In addition, 
the zircaloy cladding oxidisation rate may increase significantly in the steam-water 
environment to the point that it becomes autocatalytic, leading to cladding and fuel melt. 
These fuel failure mechanisms can impact the geometry and the ability to cool the core. As 
a result, more penalising safety design criteria were established for LOCA conditions, the 
origins and rationale of which are explained in the NEA report [NEA, 2009, page 27], which 
can be summarised as follows: 
 Peak cladding temperature {OR 2.6b - Peak cladding temperature, LOCA}. The fuel 
cladding temperature shall not exceed 1204o C. 
 Maximum cladding oxidation {subset of SF 2.4}. The total oxidation of the cladding 
shall not exceed 17% of the original cladding thickness. 
 Maximum hydrogen generation {subset of SF 2.4}. The total amount of hydrogen 
generated from the chemical reaction of the cladding with water or steam shall not 
exceed 1% of the amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding 
were to react. 
 Coolable geometry {subset of SF 2.2}. The core geometry shall remain in a condition 
that allows cooling. 
 Long-term cooling {same as DR 2.6}. The systems designed to remove the decay heat 
must be able to maintain the core temperature at an acceptably low value for an 





The literature review confirms the stringent regulatory requirements associated with nuclear 
power plant designs. Specific regulations exist for common reactor types that dictate 
minimum safety functions and design criteria. Where they do not exist, new methodologies 
and appropriate acceptance criteria need to be agreed with the regulator. The safety analysis 
of the different categories of occurrences must verify that the criteria are respected. 
Operational requirements ensure the input assumptions used in these analyses are respected 
at all times during plant operations, and determine the operational flexibility of the plant.  
2.3 Review of the safety aspects of the NuScale SMR design 
An overview of the NuScale design was obtained from the Final Safety Analysis Report 
submitted as part of the application for design certification [NuScale, 2018, chapter 4]. The 
plant design is based on a pressurised light water reactor with a unique primary system 
design. The complete primary circuit is contained within the reactor vessel and the coolant 
circulates by natural convection eliminating the need for primary pumps and large primary 
pipes external to the reactor. The complete integrated reactor vessel is housed within a metal 
containment vessel with minimal penetrations, see figure 1. Both the containment and 
reactor vessels are factory manufactured. The complete Nuclear Steam Supply System 
(NSSS) is thus pre-manufactured, shipped to site and the complete module is installed in a 
reactor pool that is filled with water.  
The reactor pool acts as the ultimate heat sink, and is constructed below ground level for 
maximum strength and security and to minimise the impact of external environmental 
events. The steam conditions delivered from the NSSS module can be coupled to a standard 
steam turbine generator set or any other steam cycle application. During normal operation, 
the space between the reactor vessel and the containment is maintained under vacuum to 
reduce the heat loss from the reactor vessel and to eliminate the need for any insulation 
material, thereby removing the industry concern associated with blockages due to lagging 
material during accident conditions.  
The NuScale plant is designed with a reactor thermal power rating of 160 MWt producing 
a gross electrical output of approximately 50 MWe. The reactor system is designed to 
operate at a system pressure of 12.7 MPa, an average core inlet temperature of 258.3o C and 
an average temperature rise in the core of 37.8o C [NuScale, 2018, chapter 1, page 44]. It 





output, with a feed water temperature of 149o C [NuScale, 2018, chapter 10, page 12]. The 
efficiency of the NuScale plant, due to the primary system operating conditions, will be 
similar to that of a standard PWR, in the order of 33%. 
 
Figure 1 -  NuScale reactor vessel and containment vessel schematic  
with main steam, feedwater and Diverse Heat Removal (DHR) connections [NuScale, 2011] 
The reactor core consists of 37 fuel assemblies similar in design to the 17x17 design fuel 
assemblies used in PWRs but shorter. The plant uses water as the coolant and moderator, 
and soluble boron is added to the coolant for reactivity control to compensate for fuel 
burnup. There are 16 control rods organized in two banks: a shutdown bank used during 
shutdown and reactor trip events and a regulating bank used during normal plant operation 
to control reactivity. The fuel cycles are designed for a nominal 2-year length with a fuel 
enrichment of 4.95% and a maximum fuel burnup of 62 GWd/MTU. The core is surrounded 
by a neutron reflector which allows fresh fuel assemblies to be placed on the periphery of 
the core, to reduce the peaking factors, without compromising neutron utilization. 
As there is no large bore primary piping outside the reactor vessel, there is no potential 
initiator that can lead to a LOCA situation. The required emergency core cooling system 
(ECCS) is designed to initiate a LOCA by distributing the coolant between the reactor vessel 





ECCS consists of three reactor vent valves mounted on the head of the reactor pressure 
vessel and two reactor recirculation valves mounted on the side of the reactor vessel in the 
down-comer region at a height above that of the core, see figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 - NuScale emergency core cooling system schematic [NuScale, 2011[ 
All five ECCS valves are closed during normal operation and open during accident 
conditions. Core heat is removed through boiling in the core and the water that is vaporized 
leaves the reactor vessel as steam through the reactor vent valves. The steam is condensed 
and collected in the containment, and returned to the downcomer region inside the reactor 
vessel through the reactor recirculation valves. The containment is sized such that the 
displacement of liquid from the reactor vessel into the containment establishes a liquid level 
above the reactor recirculation valves and the top of the core, establishing a natural closed 
circulation loop and keeping the core covered at all times. The natural circulation loop 
removes decay and residual heat from the core and reactor vessel into the containment. The 
heat in the containment is then transferred by conduction and convection to the water of the 
reactor pool. 
As a result, during ECCS operation, there is no actual loss of water inventory from the 
closed natural circulation loop established between the reactor vessel and the containment. 
The reactor pool water volume provides cooling for over 30 days by which time the decay 
heat would have reduced to a level that can be removed by convection air cooling of the 





system is completely passive and does not rely on inventory makeup from an external source 
or the availability of electric supplies. 
 
Figure 3 – NuScale long term accident cooling evolution [NuScale, 2011] 
The approach taken in the design of the NuScale plant has focused on eliminating initiating 
events, rather than managing symptoms and demonstrating that the impact on the public is 
acceptable. The design of the plant does not have a credible LOCA initiating event (large 
break resulting in a loss of reactor coolant) due to the integrated reactor vessel. The reactor 
vessel and containment vessel interaction during ECCS operation ensures that the core 
remains covered with no loss of coolant inventory thereby maintaining an adequate DNBR. 
As a result, the core temperature can be maintained at an acceptably low level and the decay 
heat can be removed indefinitely in this passive manner. 
The approach of maintaining primary inventory and DNBR (margin to the CHF) ensures 
that the LOCA limits for PCT, oxidation, and hydrogen production are not violated, as they 
are temperature driven and require the fuel to be uncovered. This also removes challenges 
to fuel integrity associated with a LOCA, eliminating changes in core geometry from fuel 
failure that would prevent the core from being amenable to cooling. 
The maximum hypothetical fission product source term used to assess the public impact of 
a nuclear plant has historically been linked to LOCA as it was the most penalising accident 





damage, alternate postulations to define the source term are required [NuScale, 2015, page 
2] the origin for the maximum postulated source term that can be released must focus more 
on other events, fuel handling type accidents and operational level releases. 
In summary, the NuScale design includes features focused on the prevention of severe 
accidents, preventing fuel damage and reducing the susceptibility of the plant to external 
events. This must translate into a significant reduction in the core damage frequency (CDF) 
and the large release fraction per module when compared to the current fleet of nuclear 
reactors. The NuScale developers are claiming in their design certification application 
[NuScale, 2018, chapter 19, page136] a CDF per module of 3.0E-10 per year and a mean 
value large release frequency of 2.3E-11 per year. These values are significantly lower than 
the typical industry values, but considering the plant design features, they are considered 
feasible.  
2.4 Review of the Safety aspects of the AHTR concept design 
The basic concept of the proposed AHTR plant envisaged by Eskom [Eskom, 2017] is based 
on the experience gained on the PBMR program, advances in HTGR designs, and the 
continuous improvement in the high temperature performance of materials and TRISO fuel 
[WNN, 2013]. As early as 2004 a Very High Temperature gas Reactor (VHTR) shown in 
figure 4 was being proposed as an evolutionary development of high temperature gas 
reactors [Chapin, 2004], due to the improvement in efficiency at the higher temperatures 
and the better thermal conditions for process heat applications. 
 





The basic form of the proposed AHTR concept design [Eskom, 2017] is a high temperature 
helium cooled gas reactor driving a gas turbine generator set in a direct Brayton cycle. A 
variation of the design includes process heat being transferred to an intermediate molten salt 
circuit via helium-to-molten salt heat exchangers. The use of molten salt in an intermediate 
cooling loop reduces the probability of water ingress into the helium circuit, and provides 
the option of thermal storage. The heat from the molten salt is then converted into steam to 
drive a steam turbo-generator set in a Rankin cycle, see figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 – AHTR concept plant schematic [ESKOM, 2017] 
The molten salt circuit of the plant includes thermal storage that can be sized to allow the 
plant to meet different network demand profiles. By varying the capacity of the molten salt 
storage, the steam cycle and the turbine generator set, the plant can be designed to support 
networks with significant variation in the daily load profile, while maintaining a constant 
load on the reactor. The concept plant design delivers a nominal power of 100 MWe, which 
is made up of 30 MWe (base load) from the gas turbine-generator and 70 MWe from the 
steam turbine-generator (equivalent base load power assuming no storage). The thermal 
efficiency of the Brayton cycle operating above 1000o C will be around 55%. The Rankin 
cycle efficiency will be higher than that of a PWR due to the high temperature of the salt in 





power of the two cycles improves the overall energy efficiency of the plant, which is 
expected to be around 50%. 
The reactor vessel is a concrete structure onto which a single vertical shaft, power 
conversion unit is directly mounted. The power conversion unit includes the gas turbine, the 
compressors, the generator and heat exchangers in an integral factory manufactured unit, 
eliminating the need for high temperature gas piping. The concrete reactor vessel is the 
ultimate heat sink, and is constructed below ground level for maximum strength and 
security. The helium flow is from bottom to top, entering at the bottom and extracting heat 
from the reactor fuel as it flows up through the reactor. On exiting the reactor at around 
1200o C it enters directly the high speed gas turbine. On exiting the turbine, it is routed 
through a heat exchanger before continuing upwards through the compressors and pre-
coolers. On exiting the last compressor stage, the helium is routed back down to the bottom 
of the reactor at around 400o C.  
The use of helium as a coolant provides excellent neutronic and thermal characteristics in 
combination with the graphite moderator. Helium is suited to the high temperatures of an 
HTGR as it does not undergo any phase change and remains chemically inert, even at the 
postulated accident temperatures. Thus, chemical interactions with the fuel and graphite 
moderator are avoided. The technical challenges of using helium at the postulated AHTR 
temperatures are discussed in chapter 5. 
The reactor core is a cylindrical cavity formed by the reflector made from graphite blocks. 
Two independent Reactivity Control Systems are provided, both of which insert absorber 
materials into channels located in the reflector. Both are designed to independently shut 
down the reactor if required, while one also manages any reactivity changes required during 
normal operations. If both the control rod systems fail, the rise in fuel temperature will cause 
the temperature driven reactivity coefficients to shut down the reactor from any power level 
even following a loss of forced cooling [INL, 2011, page 18]. The reactor core is filled with 
TRISO fuel contained in graphite balls in a once through fuel cycle. Used fuel balls are 
extracted from the bottom of the core, and fresh fuel balls are added to the top of the core 
while the unit is operating. 
The TRISO fuel consists of uranium oxide particles less than a millimetre in diameter, 





fission products which is stable to very high temperatures [IAEA, 1997, page 433]. These 
particles are then arranged in a billiard ball-sized pebble of graphite encased in silicon 
carbide, each with about 15 000 fuel particles amounting to about 9 grams of uranium. Due 
to the fuel structure containing significantly more graphite that uranium by volume, HTGR 
cores are relatively large for the power they produce, resulting in low core power densities. 
This large thermal capacity of the core provides thermal stability during normal operations 
and the ability to passively remove the decay heat by thermal convection, conduction and 
radiation from the core to the reactor vessel [European Commission, 2017, section 7.2]. In 
response to a LOCA the temperature of the core will increase to a maximum fuel 
temperature within a period of days, after which it will slowly decrease [Saragi, 2015] 
[IAEA, 2010, chapter 9]. The design of the reactor core, structure and vessel must 
demonstrate that the maximum fuel temperature remains below the temperature at which 
fuel integrity can be assured. 
In 2004, to demonstrate its inherent safety features, the 10 MWt high-temperature gas-
cooled demonstration reactor (HTR-10) at Tsinghua University near Beijing was subjected 
to extreme safety tests when the helium circulation was stopped without the reactor being 
shut down. The tests confirmed that without any of the control rods being inserted, the heat 
up of the fuel and the temperature driven reactivity coefficients can shutdown the reactor 
and bring the reactor power safely to a stable low level. During the tests, the heat generated 
in the core was passively dissipated without causing unacceptably high temperature in any 
of the components and fuel temperature was limited to 1250o C [Hu, 2004]. The results of 
these tests were used as an additional means of benchmarking existing HTGR codes [IAEA, 
2013, section 2]. 
The European Commission report also modelled the VHTR under loss of cooling accident 
and the results showed that in the worst scenario only a few percent of the fuel elements 
(less than 5%) reached temperatures between 1500o C and an upper limit of 1550o C. The 
time span for which these fuel elements experienced these conditions was relatively short, 
approximately 30 hours [European Commission, 2017, page 134]. In the VHTR core design, 
the higher temperature increases are experienced in the top part of the core [European 
Commission, 2017, page 131]. The power is higher at the top because the cold coolant gas 
enters the core from the top which results in the top of the core having the least negative 





Performance tests on coated particle fuel have shown particle failure to be a function of 
temperature, the temperature profile and burnup experienced by the fuel [European 
Commission, 2017, chapter 4]. From the analysis of the results of the tests performed, no 
fuel particle failure was observed in fuel with burnup below 11% FIMA (equivalent to about 
100 GWd/MTU) at 1600oC, while fuel with higher burnup (>14% FIMA) showed fuel 
particle failure during the first 300 hours at 1600o C. The report indicates that the allowable 
fuel temperature limit may be higher than 1600o C if the maximum burnup in the fuel is kept 
below 11% FIMA. Tests performed at US laboratories found that with the particles they 
irradiated and tested, most of the medium-lived fission products remain inside the TRISO 
particles up to 1800o C [WNN, 2013][INL, 2017]. 
Therefore the expected fuel failure probability and the resultant fission product releases are 
extremely low as long as the maximum fuel temperature is respected and the quality of the 
manufacturing process is maintained [IAEA, 2010, section 8.11]. As a result, strict process 
and quality controls are needed during the production of the coated particles and the fuel 
spheres. Fuel failure predictions and the quality of the fabrication methods must be validated 
through testing of irradiated fuel particles at temperatures that envelope the calculated 
accident temperature profile.  
The European Commission report on the safety considerations of the VHTR [European 
Commission, 2017, page 51] concluded that the German fuel development programme over 
two decades from 1980 to 1995 constitutes a convincing demonstration of excellence in fuel 
manufacture. This together with the successful testing of fuel particles at 1800o C [WNN, 
2013] demonstrates that extremely low fuel failure rates can be achieved for all operating 
and accident conditions.  
In addition, if the coated fuel particle integrity and its ability to contain the fission products 
can be assured, then the standard functional requirement of a containment system for a 
nuclear plant can be relaxed. At the most, a low leakage confinement may be needed rather 
than a leak tight containment vessel/building. With high fuel reliability, the helium 
circulating system activity during normal operations will be low and any large sudden 
release of helium would not require filtering. It is only the potential release from fuel particle 
failures that might occur during the core heatup following an accident, that constitute the 
release source term. Due to the low failure probability, the quantity and rate of release of 





Although the AHTR is still in the concept phase, it has all the inherent safety features of a 
HTGRs which preclude the need for any active safety systems. The general HTGR inherent 
and passive safety features can be summarised as follows [INL, 2014, page 9] [IAEA, 2010, 
page 12]: 
 The beneficial high temperature characteristics of the TRISO coated fuel particles, the 
graphite moderator and the helium coolant. The advantage of using helium as a coolant 
is that even in the accident temperature ranges, it has no heat transfer limit and does 
not change phase. 
 The passive heat removal capability from the core, which due to the low power density 
and large height-to-diameter ratio assures sufficient heat removal, even in the absence 
of the primary coolant and without the need for active systems. 
 The low power density and high heat capacity of the core results in slow and 
predictable temperature transients. 
 The use of fuel that has a high radionuclide retention capability even at high 
temperatures. 
 No corrosion or interaction with the fuel or reactor due to the coolant as the fuel, 
graphite moderator and helium coolant are chemically compatible under all 
conditions. This reduces the build-up of radioactive corrosion products within the 
reactor cooling circuit.  
 The inherent ability to limit reactivity and power excursions through the reactor self-
shutdown due to a large combined negative reactivity temperature coefficient. 
 Safety is not dependent on the presence of the helium coolant.  
 No active safety system requiring electrical power, nor is any operator intervention 
needed to respond to any of the postulated HTGR accident scenarios throughout their 
licencing history. The response times of the reactor under accident conditions are long 
(days as opposed to seconds) and the design is insensitive to operator errors. 
The final AHTR design will have to demonstrate that the temperature of the fuel does not 
exceed the maximum allowable fuel temperature during accident conditions. This could 
pose a challenge to the objective of increasing the reactor coolant outlet temperature to 
1200o C. The use of a once through fuel cycle results in the fuel being stratified by burnup. 
As the maximum temperature limit of the fuel is less for fuel with high burnup, having the 





operating temperature, ensures the greatest margin for the fuel with high burnup. However, 
the once through cycle also results in a power profile that matches the temperature gradient 
across the core in normal operations. This temperature and power gradient combined with 
the higher operating temperature reduces the margin for the fresh fuel at the top of the core 
to the maximum fuel temperature limit, which may require the operating temperature to be 
reduced. 
The AHTR design once finalised should exceed the required Probabilistic Safety Criteria 
for Core Damage Event Frequency of less than 1E-5 per year [IAEA, 1999, page 11] by a 
large margin. A paper on the PSA for next generation nuclear plants did not identify any 
credible accident scenarios for HTGRs that lead to core damage, even when considering 
scenarios with a frequency of occurrence as low as 5E-7 per year [INL, 2011, page 19]. 
2.5 Comparison of the safety aspects of the two SMRs 
Irrespective of the design of a nuclear plant, the demonstration of safety can only be 
accomplished through analysis using qualified codes and appropriate acceptance criteria, of 
the worst postulated challenges to the fundamental safety functions. Table 1 summarises 
how the identified safety functions are addressed in the NuScale and AHTR designs.  
Safety Function NuScale AHTR Comment 
SF 2.1 - Control 
of reactivity  
Two independent methods 
– control rods and soluble 
boron. (typical PWR 
arrangement) 
Two independent methods 
with control systems, and 
ability to accommodate 
significant temperature 




Both include the use of 
control rods designed to 
regulate power. 
SF 2.2 - Control 
of heat removal  
Ability to passively 
remove decay heat even in 
LOCA conditions, by 
maintaining a water level 
above the core while 
passively transferring heat 
away from the core 
through the containment 
vessel.   
 
Ability to passively remove 
decay heat even in LOCA 
conditions, heat generated 
in the core can passively 
dissipate through the reactor 
structure, ensureing that the 
fuel does not exceed its 
temperature limit. 
  
The smaller power ratings 
and lower core power 
densities of the SMRs 
enable the use of passive 
systems for heat removal. 
 
SF 2.3 - Control 
/ containment of 
radioactive 
material  
Fuel failure is prevented 
by keeping the core 
flooded with adequate heat 
removal capacity. 
Additional containment 
Fuel failure of the high-
quality ceramic coated-
particle fuel is avoided as 
fuel does not exceed “fuel 
damage” temperatures 
during accident conditions. 
In both cases, the 
confinement of reactivity is 






provided by the 
containment vessel. 
Relies on coated fuel 
particle to perform 
containment function. 
 
SF 2.4 - Control 
of chemical 
attack  
Fuel cladding oxidation 
and embrittlement is 
prevented by ensuring fuel 
remains covered with 
water.  
Use of an inert helium as 
the coolant and the use of 
helium to molten-salt heat 
exchangers to avoid the 
possibility of water ingress 
into the helium circuit. 
 
The known forms of 
chemical attack have either 
been removed or the 
conditions under which 
they occur are prevented. 
Table 1 - How the Safety Functions are achieved in the NuScale and AHTR SMRs. 
The ability to address the safety functions in a passive manner removes the need for many 
of the design requirements applicable to standard light water reactors to mitigate condition 
III and IV occurrences. This significantly reduces the complexity of the plant design. A 
comparison of the applicability of current-generation plant design requirements to the two 
SMR designs is reflected in Table 2. 
Design 
Requirement 
Current‐generation application SMR application 




Current‐generation plant safety‐related 
systems include two independent: 
 High‐pressure safety injection systems. 
 Low‐pressure safety injection systems. 
 Emergency feedwater systems, storage 
tanks, and emergency cooling water 
supplies. 
 
 No active safety injection system 
required. Core cooling is 
maintained using passive systems.  
 Ability to remove core heat 
without an emergency feedwater 
system. 
DR 2.2 - 
Containment 
building 
Requires a large containment structure that:  
 can withstand the energy released 
during a LOCA and contain any 
radioactive material released from 
damaged fuel. 
 contains sumps with filters to collect 
water so that the safety‐related pumps 
can continuously circulate cooling 
water. 
 has the ability for heat removal and a 
spray system to manage the 
containment environment. 
Containment function is performed by 
the fuel as fuel damage is prevented. 
The NuScale design does include a 
containment vessel as part of its 
modular design.  
 
Building structure only needs to 
perform a limited confinement 
function. 
 Recirculation and spray systems 
are not required.  
 No additional heat removal 
systems are required because of 
the passive heat removal. 
 




Designs require Redundant Emergency 
diesel generators, redundant electrical 
distribution systems and in many situations 
a station blackout supply. 
Design does not require any emergency 
power systems. Core heat is removed 
by passive heat transfer to the 
surrounding structures. 
 
DR 2.4 - External 
hazards 
Following the Fukushima incident, there is 
a requirement to analyse the capability of 
the plant beyond the design basis envelope 
and to provide the capability to manage the 
plant through additional external measures 
 Reactor built below ground level. 
 Resistant to external impact. 






should the plant systems be impacted by an 
external hazard.  
 
DR 2.5 - 
Probabilistic risk 
frequencies 
Safety relies on equipment to be able to 
perform as expected. Probabilistic Risk 
profile is influenced by: 
 Complexity of the required systems.  
 Testing required to verify operability 
of plant. 
 Equipment reliability, common mode 
failures and human error. 
 
Goal of not more than 10E–5 severe core 
damage events per plant operating year. 
 
Simpler plant design and passive safety 
systems significantly reduces the plant 
complexity and risk.  
 
Safety does not rely on the operation of 
complex safety systems. 
 
NuScale - CDF per module of 3.0E-10 
per year. 
 
AHTR – No credible CDF scenarios. 
DR 2.6 – Assured 
long term cooling 
Besides assured electrical power sources, 
the long term operability requires support 
systems like: 
 Closed water systems for the cooling 
of safety related components. 
 The availability of an ultimate heat 
sink and the associated interfacing 
systems. As they are active systems, 
they are subject to failure from 
external influences such as fouling, oil 
spills and extreme weather conditions. 
 Ventilating, cooling, air supply, 
control systems, etc – needed to 
support the operation of safety‐related 
systems. 
 
SMR designs are passive and heat is 
removed by conduction and 
convection. 
 
As there are no large active safety 
related components, there is no need 
for closed water cooling systems. 
 
Access to a specific external heat sink 
is not required. 
 
The design eliminates the need for 
safety related support systems. 
DR 2.7 – Fuel 
failure fraction 
It is accepted that during severe accidents a 
percentage of the fuel will fail – releasing 
their inventory of fission products. It is the 
function of the containment {DR 2.2} to 
limit the spread to the environment.  
The design of both the NuScale and 
AHTR plants exclude the possibility of 
fuel failure: 
 NuScale - Fuel failure is prevented 
by keeping the core flooded with 
adequate heat removal. 
 AHTR - Fuel failure is avoided as 
fuel cannot exceed “fuel damage” 
temperature 
 
Table 2 – Applicability of current generation plant design requirements to the NuScale and AHTR SMRs. 
In summary, based on the literature reviewed the design philosophies of both the NuScale 
and AHTR concepts are advances on existing technologies and indications are that they both 
exceed the level of safety envisaged for the next generation of nuclear reactors. However, 
like most SMR concepts, they both still require regulatory acceptance based on detailed 








NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS OF LOAD FOLLOW OPERATION 
This chapter reviews the requirements for power plants to be able to load follow, the impact 
that load following has on the reactor of a nuclear power plant and the expected flexibility 
of SMRs. 
3.1 Load Following Requirements 
The top priority of an operator of an electrical power system is keeping the grid stable. 
While the electricity demand can vary for many reasons, there are a number of common 
factors that influence the demand profile for all grid systems [IAEA, 2018(b), Page 11]. The 
dominant drivers for the variations in electricity demand are: 
 Time of day: Electrical demand is typically lower at night than during the day. No two 
networks will have the same demand profile but they will typically reflect the 
minimum electricity demand at night, which can be in the order of 60 - 80% of the 
demand during the day. The daily demand profile may reflect routine peaks at specific 
periods of the day determined by the consumption of the different consumer groups. 
 Day of week: Electrical demand also depends on the day of the week. Demand is 
generally lower on weekends and public holidays. 
 Season of year: The daily and weekly electrical demand patterns reflect a seasonal 
influence and depending on the climate can vary significantly between summer and 
winter. In the case of South Africa, the seasonal influence on the demand profile is in 
the size and duration of the morning and evening peaks. The typical summer and 
winter daily demand profiles experienced in South Africa during 2018 are shown in 
figure 6. 
 Weather conditions: Weather conditions such as the ambient temperature or rain can 
cause a significant deviation to the expected electricity demand. In general, the 
average daily demand tends to be higher on days where the temperature is either hotter 
or colder than average. 
As the variation in the electricity demand due to time and forecasted weather conditions can 
be predicted, system operators are able to forecast the long-term demand and the demand 





generating plants are required to be able to operate at different power levels in order to meet 
the predicted variations in electricity demand. Renewable sources (wind and solar) generate 
whenever they can and are unable to assist the system operator in managing the variable 
demand. This can only be done by dispatchable generating sources, typically coal, nuclear 
and gas, which can be operated either predominantly at constant full output (baseload), or 
at different power levels determined by the system operator to match the demand (load 
following). Load following would normally entail operating at a high output during the day 
and a low power level at night. As these requirements are forecasted ahead of time, 
generating units can plan and schedule the required load following changes in advance. 
Some generating units are only called upon to operate occasionally during short periods of 
excessively high demand (peaking). 
Figure 6 - Variation in electricity demand for a typical summer and winter day in South Africa in 2018 
(Source: Eskom National Control). 
The load factor of a power plant is a measure of the actual energy produced by a power plant 
over a period of time compared to the maximum energy it could have produced in the same 
time period.. A plant operating as a baseload station would therefore have a load factor close 
to 100%. Based on the demand profile reflected in figure 6, the average load factor for all 
the dispatchable generators needed to meet the system demand on an average winter’s day 










































































































































































































































Actual 2018 Summer Profile for Residual Demand Actual 2018 Summer Profile for RSA Contracted Demand
Actual 2018 Winter Profile for Residual Demand Actual 2018 Winter Profile for RSA Contracted Demand
Residual demand - demand met by dispatchable plant under the control of the System Operator. (i.e. the Eskom fleet) 





operating as baseload stations with load factors close to 100%, the system operator would 
have required the remaining generators to be operate with load factors of only 60%. 
In addition to the predictable, time dependent variations in electricity demand, there are 
other variations in demand that continuously influence the balance between production and 
demand. These random variations, which occur in timescales of minutes and seconds, 
manifest in changes to the system frequency. Maintaining the balance between demand and 
supply requires the availability of reserves that can be called upon through primary and 
secondary frequency control systems and grid operator action (tertiary control) 
[Bruynooghe et al, 2010, page 8]. 
 Primary frequency control is performed automatically (within seconds) by the speed 
governor, which regulates the speed of the prime mover, of each generating unit 
connected to the power system that is capable of performing primary frequency 
control. The governor settings ensure that each generator responds to a disturbance in 
a proportional way and prevents the governors competing against each other. The 
primary regulation maintains the balance between the power demanded and power 
produced by changing the speed (frequency) in relation to the referenced speed. 
 Secondary frequency control is triggered within tens of seconds, and is sometimes 
referred to as Automatic Generation Control. After a change in load and the 
consequent primary frequency control response, the resultant system frequency will 
differ from the nominal value [Undrill, 2018, page 14]. The secondary frequency 
control method entails a control action developed automatically at a central level by 
the system operator to increase or decrease the load set point of the generating units 
performing the secondary frequency control function, to return the frequency to within 
the desired nominal value within a time frame of minutes. 
 Tertiary frequency control is triggered within a few minutes by a grid operator if a 
frequency deviation is not automatically correct through primary or secondary 
frequency control. It typically involves the grid operator manually dispatching some 
generating units. 
There will also be the occasional large change in system frequency caused by a sudden 
imbalance between supply and demand such as a trip of a large generating unit, the 
disconnecting of a large load or a system fault that challenges the stability of the grid. These 





operated with sufficient reserves. In addition, each generator connected to the grid must 
respond in a predicted manner under upset conditions to allow the system operator to ensure 
the stability in grid frequency as well as grid voltage. 
In order for the system operator to control the grid system voltage, it is necessary for 
generating units to be able to assist in the control of reactive power. It is the design of the 
electrical generator, the exciter and the connection to the transmission system determines 
the range of reactive power that a plant can provide. For a nuclear unit it is therefore totally 
independent of the design of the nuclear portion of the plant. The maximum amount of 
reactive power that a generator can provide can generally be increased by reducing the 
active power from full load. In extreme situations, a system operator may require a plant to 
reduce power to provide a greater range of reactive power for voltage control. This can 
therefore be considered an additional form of flexible operation [IAEA, 2018(b), page 9]. 
It is therefore necessary for all generating plants feeding electricity into a grid, to comply 
with clearly defined requirements contained in the relevant grid codes for the network to 
which it is connected [Modern Power Systems, 2017]. These rules define the minimum 
requirements based on the requirements of the grid operator and they evolve as the grid 
dynamics change. For example, in the past, the general rules in the EU specified for small 
generators that under upset conditions they should trip within a very short time. Today 
however, due to the significant contribution of renewables and distributed power producers 
to the total supply, tripping them too early could result in a partial or even complete system 
collapse. As a result, manufacturers of power plants and generators should keep careful 
track of national regulations as they progress, in order to ensure their products comply with 
the latest requirements. 
The European Utility Requirements for LWR nuclear power plants was developed as a 
common accepted specification for use in the EU: it requires modern reactors to have 
significant manoeuvrability and be able to operate in a load following mode. The European 
Utility Requirements specified load following capabilities for a unit can be summarised as 
follows [Lokhov, 2012]:  
 The unit must be capable of continuous operation between 50% and 100% of rated 





 Primary frequency control range of 2% of the rated power is mandatory. The unit must 
be capable of achieving the full range of control within 30 seconds and be able to 
maintain it for at least 15 minutes. Higher control ranges up to 5% may be agreed with 
the system operator. 
 Secondary frequency control is not mandatory. If provided, it should include a range 
of 10% of the rated power and a rate of change of 1% Pn/min. (higher rates can be 
agreed with the system operator up to a max of 5% Pn/min) 
 The unit must be able to perform load following for 90% of the fuel cycle. It is 
accepted that load following is restricted due to fuel conditions at the end of the cycle. 
The unit shall be able to load follow between 100% Pn and the minimum load of the 
unit at a rate of change of 3% Pn/min. 
 A unit is expected to be able to perform the following scheduled load following 
transients from full power to minimum load and back to full power: 2 times per day, 
5 times per week, cumulatively 200 times per year. 
 Although not a requirement, a unit may be requested to be able to withstand large load 
rejection at a rate of change of 20% Pn/min. Many nuclear plant designs can 
accommodate a full load rejection. 
Eurelectric and VGB PowerTech assessed whether power plants across Europe are 
technically flexible enough to provide the required power ramps. The report concluded 
[Eurelectric, 2011 page 19] that nuclear power plants, based on those in Europe, are 
technically suitable to perform load following operations (average 5% ramp rate and power 
range between 100% and 50%). Their limitation is that they cannot be brought online from 
shutdown or standby conditions in time frames similar to those of the other technologies. 
3.2 Power changes and the reactor 
Most nuclear power plant reactor designs have strong manoeuvring capabilities. This is 
evident in France and in Germany where Nuclear power plants operate in load following 
mode, i.e. some units performing primary and secondary frequency control, while others 
follow a variable load schedule involving one or two large power changes per day [NEA, 
2011, page 49]. In France nuclear load following is needed since nuclear power constitutes 
a large share in the national mix. While in Germany, load following became necessary as 





Load following in a nuclear plant requires the reactor power to increase or decrease to match 
the thermal power being extracted from the coolant by the turbine. The thermal power 
produced in the reactor core can only be changed by influencing a parameter that results in 
a change in the overall nuclear reaction rate. The following features are the main drivers 
that change the reactivity of the core: 
 Position of the control rods. Insertion or withdrawal of the control rods involves the 
addition or removal of neutron absorbing material in the core. Inserting control rods 
adds negative reactivity that results in a reduction in power and the withdrawal of 
control rods adds positive reactivity causing power to increase. In PWRs and HTGRs 
the control rods are inserted from the top of the core. Due to their limited range of 
influence, they do not have an equal influence throughout the core and their insertion 
disturbs the neutron flux profile in the reactor core. 
 Chemical shim (not applicable to HTGRs). A change to the concentration of boron, 
which acts as a neutron absorber, in the primary coolant of a PWR adds or removes 
neutron absorbing material into the core. An increase in the concentration reduces 
power and a decrease in concentration increases power. As the boric acid is dissolved 
in the coolant which circulates throughout the entire reactor core, it has a homogenous 
effect on the core with little impact on the neutron-flux profile. This method is slow 
in controlling reactivity as it takes several minutes to change the concentration of the 
boric acid in the primary loop. For rapid changes of reactivity control rods must be 
used, boron concentration changes are used to compensate for the associated reactivity 
changes that occur at a slower rate (hours rather than minutes). 
 Changes in temperature. Changes that influence the coolant, moderator and fuel 
temperatures have an impact on the reactivity of the core. As it is difficult to change 
any operating parameter and not affect every other property of the core, they are 
collectively referred to as the power coefficient (defect). The value of the power 
coefficient is required to be negative throughout the core life. The power being 
delivered by the core has an influence on the overall reactivity of the core through the 
following temperature feedback mechanisms [NEA, 2011, page 25]: 
o Doppler coefficient: A change in fuel temperature involves the phenomenon 
usually referred to as the Doppler broadening of the neutron absorption spectrum 
of Uranium-238 in the fuel. When the temperature of the fuel rises, the absorption 





Doppler coefficient responds instantaneously to a change in power level as the 
change in energy occurs internal to the fuel. The response of the other temperature 
coefficients is slower as the heat must to be transferred to the moderator and/or 
coolant before they experience a change in temperature. The Doppler coefficient 
is one of the most important feedback mechanisms ensuring reactor safety in 
reactors. 
o Moderator coefficient: Both PWR and HTGR design, (although for different 
reasons) have a negative moderator temperature coefficient as the neutron 
moderation is less efficient at higher temperatures resulting in a decrease in 
reactivity. This negative moderator temperature coefficient is a stabilising effect 
for the reactor as any temperature rises will insert negative reactivity, reducing 
the power being produced. In a PWR, as the coolant is also the moderator and it 
contains boric acid, the decreasing of the coolant density due to a temperature 
increase also leads to a decrease in the boric acid concentration and an associated 
increase in reactivity. The overall impact remains negative as the decrease due to 
less efficient neutron moderation has a greater effect than the increase due to 
reduced neutron absorption from the change in boron concentration. It becomes 
more negative towards the end of the cycle due to the lower boron concentration. 
The power defect acts against both a power increase and a power decrease. When 
reactor power is increased quickly, the power defect causes a negative reactivity 
insertion. In a similar manner, when reactor power is decreased quickly the power 
defect causes a positive reactivity insertion. The power defect is about 2500 pcm for 
PWRs, and about 800 pcm for graphite-moderated reactors [Nuclear Power, 2019]. 
 Changes in the mass flow rate of the coolant. A change in the pressure or flow rate of 
the coolant through the reactor influences the mass flow rate and therefore the rate of 
heat transfer from the fuel to the coolant. An increase in the heat being removed from 
the fuel will result in an increase in the power being produced, while a decrease in heat 
removal will result in less power being produced. In both cases feedback from the 
power defect will drive the change in power in response to the temperature changes 
caused by the change in heat transfer. In a PWR this is not a viable option as the 
coolant is virtually incompressible at operating temperatures, and the flow cannot be 
changed as it is determined by the speed of the primary pumps which is fixed as they 





If the thermal load (turbine load) remains the same, any reactivity changes due to rod 
movement or boron concentration changes will only result in a change in the average coolant 
temperature. For example, an insertion of the control rods will initially cause a reduction in 
reactor power. However, as the thermal load being drawn from the primary coolant remains 
the same, the coolant temperature returning to the core will decrease adding positive 
reactivity from the power defect. The coolant temperature will continue to decrease until 
the reactivity addition from the power defect matches the negative reactively of the initial 
control rod insertion. As a result, the reactor returns to the same power level, matching the 
turbine load, but at a lower average coolant temperature. This natural ability of a reactor to 
match the turbine load makes it ideally suited for load following. 
3.3 Load following with a reactor and its limitations 
Due to the feedback mechanism of the power defect, the reactor power can be adjusted by 
changing the thermal load being extracted from the reactor coolant (turbine load). An 
increase in turbine load will cause the coolant return temperature to drop until the power 
defect has caused a reactivity change and a reduction in core power such that the thermal 
power being extracted from the core matches the thermal power being drawn by the turbine. 
Similarly, a decrease in turbine load will result in an increase in the coolant return 
temperature and a reduction in power being produced by the core. The challenge with load 
following is maintaining the designed relationship between the coolant temperature and 
reactor power without exceeding any Operational Requirements.  
In response to an increase in turbine load, the control rods would automatically respond to 
the drop in coolant temperature and step out in an attempt to add the additional reactivity 
needed to maintain the average coolant temperature within its targeted range. This will 
continue until the target average coolant temperature is reached. If the control rods cannot 
step out fast enough, or they reach a point where they are fully withdrawn from the core, 
the average coolant temperature will continue to drop. Without any intervention, this will 
continue until either the turbine loading is stopped or by the reactor protection system 
reaching a low coolant temperature trip setpoint. Due to this ability of the turbine to 
influence the reactor power, the turbine control system contains limits that prevent a primary 






For a decrease in turbine load, the control rods would automatically respond to the increase 
in coolant temperature and step in, to achieve the required average coolant temperature. This 
will continue until the target coolant temperature is reached. If the control rods cannot step 
in fast enough the coolant temperature will continue to increase until either the decrease in 
the load ends, manual intervention by an operator or automatically by the reactor protection 
system upon reaching an overpower related temperature trip setpoint. 
In a PWR, the axial flux distribution changes as a result of reactor power level changes. 
During normal operation the axial temperature gradient that exists in the core results in axial 
variations in the density of the coolant and its effectiveness as a moderator. As the 
moderation in the upper (hottest) part of the core is less efficient than in the lower (coolest) 
part, during a power increase, the power (flux) distribution is naturally pushed to the lower 
part of the fuel [NEA, 2011, page 25]. Inserting control rods compounds this by reducing 
the power at the top of the core, further shifting power to the lower part of the core. 
Any change in reactor power level disturbs the equilibrium concentration of Xenon (Xe-
135) within the core. Xe-135 is an extremely strong neutron absorber, with a half-life of 
around 9 hours. Xe-135 is produced from the decay of Iodine-135 (I-135) which has a half-
life of around 6.5 hours. The production rate of I-135 in the core is proportional to the reactor 
power, while the production rate of Xe-135 depends predominantly on the concentration of 
the I-135 [Lilley, 2001, page 285]. As a result, if the power of the reactor is increased, the 
concentration of Xe-135 and the associated negative reactivity decreases to a minimum after 
a period of time (in the order of 4 to 5 hours) before returning to a new equilibrium, level 
higher than before, after about 40 hours. Conversely, following a reduction in reactor power, 
the concentration of Xe-135 and the associated negative reactivity increases initially to a 
maximum before returning to a new equilibrium level lower than before, in similar time 
scales. The magnitude of the xenon reactivity changes and the initial rate of change of the 
xenon concentration depend on the reactor power levels before and after the change. As a 
result, following a change in reactor power, ongoing reactivity changes are needed, to 
compensate for the changes in Xe-135 concentration, until the new equilibrium 
concentration is reached which can challenge the manoeuvrability of the plant. 
The NuScale design, like most PWRs, uses both the control rods and boron concentration 
adjustments to manage the reactivity changes associated with the change in reactor power 





chapter 4 page 4.3-4]. HTGRs only have the use of control rods to compensate for all forms 
of reactivity changes associated with load following. Like what was done for the PBMR, 
the AHTR design analysis will have to demonstrate that the rod control system is capable 
of managing the reactivity requirements associated with the plant defined load following 
capability [Rietsma, 2004]. 
The use of “regulating control rods” (also referred to as “grey” rods) with different 
characteristics to “shutdown control rods” is a routine feature in new plant designs as they 
improve the load following capability of a nuclear plant. The design of the regulating control 
rods is optimised to cause smaller depressions in the neutron flux in the vicinity of the rods 
allowing them to be inserted deeper into the core. This enables them to compensate for large 
power changes with limited impact on the axial flux distribution [IAEA, 2018(b), page 71]. 
As a result, on a PWR, the use of regulating control rods reduces the need for the large, 
relatively fast, changes in boron concentration that would typically be needed during a 
100%-75%-100% load following sequence [NEA, 2011, page 32, 34]. 
As the safety analysis must cover all possible initiating conditions, it has to include incident 
initiation from the intermediate power levels allowed during load follow operation. In some 
incident sequences, the most penalising initial plant conditions could be during load 
following operation as the redistribution of power in the core due to the power change can 
result in peaking factors higher than those experienced during baseload operating 
conditions. Therefore, as described in chapter 2, operational limitations may be imposed to 
limit the amplitude of such perturbations and ensure the plant is always operated within the 
design and the safety analysis [IAEA, 2018(b) page 48]. Although the design studies must 
demonstrate the plant load following capability, the following are three common examples 
of physical operational limitations that must be respected which could constrain the 
flexibility of a plant if not managed appropriately: 
 Control rod insertion limits. During operation insertion limits restrict the amount by 
which the control rods can be inserted for a given power level. The instantaneous 
negative relativity insertion that would occur should the regulating control rods be 
inserted from above these limits would be sufficient to shut down the reactor as per 
the safety analysis. During load following operation boron concentration changes may 
be required to allow the control rods to be withdrawn back above the power dependant 





 Axial flux deviations. During operation, variations in the axial flux profile are limited 
to ensure the core power peaking factors used in the safety analysis are respected and 
to prevent inadvertent xenon oscillations (axial or radial) that the reactor cannot 
naturally suppress. These xenon oscillations can go unnoticed as they do not impact 
the overall power level of the reactor yet they can cause local power peaks. In a PWR, 
the measure of axial offset (often referred to as delta I) is derived from the difference 
between the flux in the top and bottom sections of the reactor as measured by the 
neutron detectors positioned outside the reactor vessel. A constant axial offset control 
scheme is commonly used to control the axial flux distribution. It involves maintaining 
the axial offset within a tolerance band around a target value for each specific power 
level [NuScale, 2018, chapter 4, page 4.3-9]. As a result, during power changes, rod 
position changes together with boron concentration adjustments may be required to 
return or maintain the axial flux difference within the target band. In addition, as the 
concentration and distribution of xenon within the core are both flux and time 
dependent, core operation outside the defined acceptable range can increase the 
probability of initiating a xenon oscillation within the core [Nuclear Power, 2018]. 
 Power ramp rates: Light water reactor fuel is manufactured with a gap between the 
fuel pellet and the cladding. During operation in the reactor, the fuel pellets expand 
due to thermal expansion and irradiation induced swelling at different rates to the 
cladding. This reduces and may even close the gap resulting in contact between the 
fuel pellet and the cladding. An increase in local power density may, due to this 
different expansion rates, produce sufficient increase in cladding stress to cause 
cladding failure. Recent operating history and the prevailing operating conditions (eg 
current and recent power levels and the rate of power changes) influence the 
magnitude of this stress. Regulators may require power manoeuvring limits to reduce 
the risk of cladding failure due to pellet-cladding interaction. This could include 
limitations on the maximum ramp rate for unconditioned fuel early in the fuel cycle 
until the fuel has been properly conditioned. As conditioned fuel can be deconditioned 
through extended low power operations (in the order of weeks), additional restrictions 
may also be required on power ramp rates following periods of extended low power 
operation [Bruynooghe, 2010, page 17]. In the NuScale design, no additional 





transient-induced cladding strain remains below the stress intensity limits [NuScale, 
2018, Chapter 4, page 4.2-18] 
The operating flexibility of the NuScale design, which through analysis has been 
demonstrated to respect all safety, design and operational limits, can accommodate a daily 
load following profile starting at 100%, ramping down to 50% over two hours, remaining 
at 50% for two to ten hours, and then ramping back up to 100% in two hours for the 
remainder of the 24-hour cycle. In addition it can operate in an automatic mode in response 
to grid frequency changes through peak-to-peak power changes of 10% Pn at 2% Pn/min, 
perform 20% Pn step demand increase or decrease within ten minutes, perform an increase 
or decrease of 10% Pn in 60 seconds without trip while operating between 50 and 100 
percent power and has the capability to remain online following a sudden load reduction 
down to the minimum operating load [NuScale, 2018, chapter 10 page 10.2-6]. This level 
of flexibility exceeds the EUR requirements for continuous operation, primary and 
secondary frequency control capability, and the ability to tolerate emergency load 
variations. The illustrative daily load following profile specified in the NuScale design 
certification application does not meet the EUR required ramp rate of 3% Pn/min, as it states 
2 hours to change power between 100% and 50%. Due to the stated ramp rates that the plant 
can achieve in response to frequency changes and step load changes and the turbine bypass 
system, it is expected that the plant could achieve the required ramp rate. 
3.4 Impact of Load Following 
In theory load following can result in the need for additional maintenance and possible 
replacement of components due to the increased wear or ageing. As nuclear power plant 
designs are required to include manoeuvrability capabilities and operation at different power 
levels there is no impact on the large static components as a result of load following. There 
could however be some influence from load following on active components (although very 
few in the SMRs) and thus one can expect a slight increase in the maintenance costs if 
compared to baseload operation [NEA, 2011, page 49]. A study to determine the cost of 
cycling and varied load operations in fossil plants could not find any (statistically) 
significant impact of starts, regardless of type, on unit reliability, and the results suggest that 
utilities, in the period of the study, performed the appropriate maintenance to address the 





concluded that it is more important how the maintenance is conducted, as the amount of 
damage and the cost of repairing damage from a forced outage is orders of magnitude greater 
than the damages and costs associated with cycling. [EPRI, 2002, page 7-7].  
The economic consequence of load following is mainly associated with the reduction in the 
load factor. [NEA, 2011, page 49]. Although the fuel costs represent only a small fraction 
of the electricity generating cost, nuclear plants that operate with a defined cycle length, like 
the NuScale design, load fuel for a cycle assuming a certain load factor. Operation at lower 
load factor than that assumed would impact on fuel costs as the fuel will be used in a non-
optimal manner. Operation at a higher load factor over the cycle is not possible unless the 
reactor is shut down earlier for refuelling. Optimising the fuel utilisation and being able to 
offset the fixed operating and maintenance costs through a higher output, results in lower 
generation costs per kilowatt-hour. High load factors are therefore needed to pay back the 
high investment costs typically associated with nuclear plants [IAEA, 2018(b), page 96].  
A study by the Nuclear Energy Agency on the impact of the deployment of renewables on 
the load factors and profitability of dispatchable technologies in the OECD countries 
concludes that for a renewable penetration of 10% and 30% the impact on the load factors 
for nuclear generators would be in the order of -4% and -20% while the impact on their 
profitability would be in the order of -23% and -39% [NEA, 2012, page 9]. 
3.5 Flexibility of SMRs 
The conclusions drawn from this research when considering SMR flexibly can be 
summarised as follows:  
 Future SMRs need to have the capability to provide flexible operation to meet 
modern grid system requirements [IAEA, 2018(b), page 101]. The increase in 
renewable capacity and the variability in their output has to be backed up by flexible 
sources. 
 Modern reactor designs can provide large operational flexibility, including the 
possibility of planned and unplanned load following in a wide power range and with 
ramps of 5% Pn/min, and extremely fast power changes in the frequency control 





around the power level. [NEA, 2011, page 49] However, they cannot be brought 
online from cold and warm conditions in timeframes similar to those of the other 
technologies, and only storage facilities such as pumped storage and hydro storage 
schemes with peak generation capabilities are able to provide the very high power 
ramps needed for large generation-driven fluctuations (that challenge the available 
reserve margin) [Eurelectric 2011, page 19]. 
 The operating limitations described in Chapter 2 {OR 2.1 to 2.6} are enforced 
through the plant Technical Operation Specifications which defines the limits that 
cannot be overstepped under normal operating conditions. The limits (such as: 
control rod positioning, flux profile deviations, maximum ramp rates, etc) ensure 
that the reactor is always operated within the analysed envelope, while providing 
adequate margin and flexibility for load following [Bruynooghe, 2010, page 14]. 
 Baseload operation of nuclear power plants is financially the preferred mode of 
operation as it provides the highest return on the capital investment. Economic 
research conducted indicates that nuclear generating units with their high capital 
costs and low fuel costs could be significantly impacted if the financial impact of 
providing flexible services are not addressed within the energy system [NEA, 2012, 
page 9] [IAEA 2018(b), page 101]. 
 The load factor and financial viability of new generation plants could be improved 
if the excess thermal energy (e.g. in forms of heat) available when operating at 
reduced electrical output could be used in other industrial applications. This could 
include district heating, desalination of sea water or supplying process heat (e.g. 
providing steam for energy intensive processes such as coal 







COGENERATION OPTIONS FOR SMRS 
This chapter explores the principal of cogeneration, the potential industrial processes and 
the potential to improve the viability of SMRs through cogeneration. In addition, the AHTR 
concept of utilising energy storage to achieve a high load factor and increased flexibility in 
generating capability is reviewed. 
4.1 Cogeneration 
Cogeneration is the simultaneous use of energy, from a single fuel source, in two or more 
applications, usually for electricity generation and another application requiring process 
heat. Matched to a suitable alternate process heat application, cogeneration with a nuclear 
plant can enable the reactor to be operated in a baseload mode while still providing the 
required flexibility in the generation of electricity. Cogeneration is also a way to maximise 
the use of the energy contained in the fuel through the efficient utilization of “waste heat” 
instead of generating the thermal energy separately for each application. The benefit of this 
approach is a possible additional source of revenue for power plants [Van Ballegooyen, 
1999]. 
An assessment of the feasibility of coupling Small Modular Reactors with cogeneration 
technologies suggests that performing load following with a combination of multiple SMRs 
is technically and economically feasible [Locatelli, 2014]. The research focused on sites 
with multiple SMRs because they offer the possibility to split the total power of individual 
units within the power station. The main technical conclusion was that if a cogeneration 
process must be operated continuously without some form of of flexibility or “buffer” 
(storage) then it is not suitable for cogeneration using only the excess thermal energy during 
flexible load following operation. The economic results showed that a desalination plant 
can be a viable investment in several scenarios, primarily because the end product is not 
consumed immediately and can be stored in some manner. From the Locatelli study, the 
feasibility and viability of cogeneration depends on not only the existence of a market for 
both products, but also on the ability to meet the variability in the demand of each, the 
impact of the variability of each product on the production of the other, and the possible 





According to the IAEA [IAEA, 2017(b)] nuclear based cogeneration for electricity and 
process heat is gaining increasing importance because of the growing awareness of the 
environmental impact of energy production. Figure 7 reflects a few examples of heat 
application processes that could be considered for cogeneration with nuclear power. The 
operating temperature ranges of the majority of the reactors in service, has limited the 
existing nuclear based cogeneration to applications whose process operating temperatures 
are under 150° C, predominantly district heating and desalination. Many potential industrial 
heat applications exist in the medium and high temperature ranges where cogeneration with 
SMRs could yield major benefits, examples of such applications include petrochemical 
processes, steel and hydrogen production. 
 
Figure 7 - Temperature ranges of heat application processes and nuclear  
power plant. [IAEA, 2017(b)]  
The IAEA analysis [IAEA, 2017(b)] shows that through cogeneration, the performance of 
a nuclear power plant can be increased due to the more efficient use of fuel and the resultant 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions can reduce the environmental impact by up to 35%. 
It highlights that an economic evaluation of the benefits of generating a second product in 
addition to electricity has to take into account the market value of the additional product, 
the volume of both products, and then be compared to the costs associated with only the 
flexible generation of electricity. The report concludes that in many cases, cogeneration 
appears competitive when compared to the cost of fossil fuel alternatives. The benefit would 
be greater and more options could be economically viable if the associated reduction in 





An analysis [Beccera et al, 2005] concluded it would be technically feasible and economical 
to use a nuclear reactor to provide the energy needed for an oil-from-sands extraction facility 
using Steam-Assisted Gravity Drainage technology. Nuclear energy was shown to be two 
to three times cheaper than the use of natural gas for each of the scenarios analysed. In 
addition, a plant producing 100,000 barrels of bitumen per day would eliminate the release 
of up to 100 megatons of carbon dioxide per year into the atmosphere by using nuclear 
energy. 
The interface between the nuclear heat source and the cogeneration production plant can be 
achieved by heat transfer directly from a heat-exchanging component in the primary circuit 
or by the heat being transferred indirectly via an intermediate circuit. The use of an 
intermediate circuit to decouple the primary circuit from the cogeneration process may be 
needed for any of the following reasons [Verfondern, 2007, page 76]: 
 For physical separation between the primary circuit and the process application plant 
for safety reasons. 
 To prevent any chance of radioactive contamination of the process application plant 
or the actual product; 
 To prevent any possible introduction of corrosive media into the primary circuit; 
 Ease of maintenance and repair of the heat utilization system; 
The heat exchanger and isolation valves that provide the interface with the primary circuit 
have to be included in the safety analysis for the nuclear portion of the facility and are 
subject to the relevant nuclear codes and standards. The cogeneration production plant itself, 
being a typical industrial facility, only needs to comply with the regulations applicable to 
that industry. The operating modes between the two plants will depend on the required 
flexibility of the grid and the cogenerated product, but all possible modes and transients will 
have to be included in the plant safety analysis. 
4.2  Cogeneration with SMRs  
As a generating option, the small size and the flexibility of the NuScale SMR modular 
design enables individual or multiple modules to facilitate the deployment of intermittent 
renewables, displacing the need for backup power from fossil-fuelled sources. The main 





 Load following (site level): shutting down one or more reactors if needed. 
 Frequency control (individual unit level): through the ability of each unit to load 
follow. 
 Load rejection or Turbine Bypass (individual unit level): the ability to bypass the 
turbine and dump steam directly to the condenser, although affecting efficiency, 
enables the turbine to change load without impacting the reactor. 
In addition, as a NuScale SMR module provides process heat (steam) which can be used for 
any industrial application, it provides the flexibility for a single or multi-module site to 
integrate with a wide range of cogeneration applications. Depending on the demand, 
modules can be switched between electricity production and providing process heat to 
support an industrial process. This flexibility enables a multi-module site to efficiently 
integrate the outputs from the different modules with the collective demands (grid and 
process heat), optimizing the primary fuel utilization. Another attractive feature of a multi-
module site is the ability to stagger the scheduled refuelling of each module. Due to the high 
level of independence between modules, when one module is off-line for fuelling the other 
modules can continue to supply the demand (electricity or steam). 
A study [Ingersoll et al, 2014] evaluated options for coupling a NuScale SMR plant to a 
various desalination technologies. The study included an economic comparison of the 
different technologies coupled to a site containing eight NuScale SMR modules. The study 
assumed a site sized to provide electricity and water (190 000 cubic meters per day) to 
support a city of 300 000 people. The analysis demonstrated that a NuScale SMR plant can 
be coupled to a desalination facility, and can economically cogenerate electricity and water, 
with a payback period as low as 17 years (excluding financing costs). 
In addition, a technical evaluation [Ingersoll et al, 2014(b)] assessed the viability of 
cogeneration supporting the large energy demands of the oil industry. As the output 
temperature of a NuScale module is at the bottom end of the process temperature range used 
in the oil industry, a variety of options were considered to boost the steam temperature. The 
economic assessment was performed for the case of a representative refinery sized to 
process 250,000 barrels/day of crude oil. The analysis showed that it is economically viable 
for a 10-module NuScale plant to cogenerate steam in support of large refinery applications 
at gas prices below the price of natural gas in many countries, without the benefit of any 





Due to its operating temperatures, a HTGR has the ability to supply cogenerated process 
heat at higher temperatures, thereby supporting a wider range of industrial applications. A 
report on the “Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform” [European Commission, 
2007] made recommendations regarding the direction of nuclear research in the European 
Union that included the application of very high temperature reactors for providing 
cogeneration capacity to industrial processes. The IAEA publication on opportunities for 
cogeneration with nuclear energy [IAEA, 2017(b) page 28] provides a summary of some of 
the results of this research and some of the conceptual HTGR cogeneration options. The 
European Commission issued a report [European Commission, 2017] on the safety 
considerations of the VHTR Module developed by Interatom/Siemens which is one of the 
most advanced HTGR concepts in Europe for cogenerating electricity and high temperature 
process heat. 
Despite the potential benefits of nuclear cogeneration, there are numerous challenges that 
will constrain its deployment [Futterer et al, 2014]. The most prevalent being the ability to 
co-site the nuclear and industrial facilities, the compatibility of the life spans of both 
facilities, the conservative nature of industry that prefers business as usual unless forced to 
change, and the need for stable long-term energy policies together with predictable nuclear 
licencing processes. 
An analysis of the economic viability of small nuclear reactors in cogeneration markets 
[Carlsson et al, 2012] could only derive target costs, based on competing energy costs in a 
range of markets, as detailed cost estimates are not publically available. More importantly 
the report highlighted that the successful operation of nuclear a nuclear plant demonstrating 
the ability to cogeneration on a production scale, would be the most convincing argument 
for potentially interested investors. 
4.3 AHTR storage option 
The AHTR concept, as depicted in figure 5, uses energy storage to produce electricity in a 
flexible manner through a direct helium Brayton cycle and a steam Rankine cycle. The 
Brayton cycle consists of a gas turbine-compressor-generator unit with helium-to-molten 
salt heat exchangers. The generator, due to the high speed, is connected to the grid via a 
static frequency converter. The objective is for the Brayton cycle to provide a constant 





circuit. This enables the reactor to operate constantly at full power, base-load operation, 
while providing flexibility through the steam turbine in the Rankine cycle. 
The energy transferred to the molten salt is stored in a hot tank at a relatively high 
temperature. As needed, the energy stored in the molten salt is converted into steam and the 
cooler molten salt is stored in a separate tank for cold molten salt. Cold molten salt is 
pumped from this cold tank to the heat exchangers in the reactor circuit to be reheated. The 
steam generated in this cycle is routed to a standard steam turbine. The complete two tank 
storage system, steam generator, turbine, condenser, feed water pumps and de-aerator 
concept is the same as that used successfully in existing Concentrated Solar Power Plants 
up to 200 MWe which have been available since 2012 [IRENA, 2012, page 10]. 
The power capacities for the concept plant is for the reactor to operate at a fixed power level 
providing a combined output of 100 MWe, which consists of 30 MWe from the generator 
in the gas cycle and a thermal energy transfer to the molten salt that enables the constant 
generation of 70 MWe from the steam turbine-generator. The ability to store the energy 
imparted to the molten salt enables the steam turbine-generator to be designed to deliver 
higher peak values. The net result is the potential for the customer to specify the required 
peak capacity and storage time needed to assist in meeting specific grid requirements. This 
provides the capability to follow a variable daily demand profile as shown in figure 8 while 
the reactor operates in a baseload mode.  
 
Figure 8 – AHTR: demand profile that could be met [Eskom, 2017] 
The profile in figure 8 could be achieved with six hours of molten salt storage capability 





100% for the reactor and the gas turbine-generator, but a load factor of only 50% for the 
steam turbine-generator (based on the generator design capacity of 140 MWe).  
The AHTR concept enables the reactor to operate at a load factor of 100% maximizing the 
possible return on the financial investment needed for the nuclear portion of the plant. The 
advantages associated with the concept are a high load factor on the reactor, the small high 
speed gas turbine generator set, the flexibility in the load profile that can be provided and 
the ability to provide a peaking capacity larger than that of the reactor. The disadvantage is 
the lower overall thermal efficiency. The feasibility of this option depends on the 
comparative cost of simply increasing the Brayton cycle capacity and operating the reactor 
at a load factor of 70%.  To achieve this, the reactor thermal capacity would have to be 
increased from around 200 MWt to around 280 MWt and the gas turbine-generator from 30 
MWe to 140 MWe. 






TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY 
This chapter reviews the technical readiness and technical uncertainties associated with the 
NuScale and AHTR concepts. The predications associated with the potential market and 
economic competitiveness of SMRs are also reviewed. 
5.1 Technical uncertainties 
The advanced designs of SMRs do not come without challenges. The technical readiness is 
a key factor for attracting prospective customers and can be demonstrated through the use 
of proven technology, physical demonstration, or the certification of the design.  
The NuScale design is based on the proven light water technology and the natural 
convection cooling has been verified in an integral test facility. This reduces the 
technological and regulatory risks and the design certification review being performed by 
the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is expected to be completed in September 2020. 
In contrast, the AHTR concept is designed outside the current HTGR experience base due 
to the temperature at which the system is being designed to operate. The feasibility of the 
concept will depend on the materials being capable of withstanding the high temperatures. 
Some of the specific technical challenges that need to be addressed are outlined below: 
 The analysis of the behaviour of the graphite structures in the core needs to take into 
account the AVR experience. During the decommissioning of the AVR, an 
inspection of the internal graphite structures showed that pieces of graphite had 
come loose and cracks had developed in some of the blocks, resulting in around 170 
pebbles remaining stuck inside the core after it was unloaded [IRSN, 2014, page 70]. 
 The safety of the AHTR design relies on the robustness of TRISO fuel. This 
robustness has been demonstrated through testing programs simulating HTGR 
operating conditions. The current accepted fuel qualification limits are 1250° C 
during normal operation with a maximum burn-up of 100 GWd/MTU, and around 
1600° C for the maximum fuel temperature during accident situations [IRSN, 2014, 
page 72]. This range may be insufficient for the AHTR due to the higher temperature 
objectives, and is currently the subject of additional fuel testing. The design analysis 





conditions does not exceed the temperature to which the fuel is qualified. Other 
HTGR projects are still targeting operating temperatures below 850° C. 
 The feasibility of the AHTR design is also based on the equipment in the hot leg of 
the primary circuit being able to withstand the high-temperatures. For the power 
conversion unit it is possible to develop a configuration where the pressure boundary 
operates at lower temperatures by being exposed to the lower compressor inlet and 
the reactor return helium temperatures. This approach is common design practice for 
gas cooled reactors and can be achieved by arranging the heat exchanges in the 
annular space around the turbine-compressor shaft with the hot helium flowing from 
the centre outwards. To fit the high temperature heat exchangers in the annular space 
it is necessary to use a compact heat exchangers design with a high power density. 
Printed circuit heat exchangers (PCHE) are a possible choice for these high 
temperature helium to molten salt heat exchange [Steven et al, 2013, page 21].  
 PCHE technology is well established in the hydrocarbon processing, petrochemical 
and refining industries. The benefits of this type of heat exchanger are the high heat 
transfer area density, the high operating temperatures, their high heat transfer 
efficiency and the low pressure drop. PCHEs are constructed by chemically etching 
metal plates and then diffusion bonding the plates together by applying high 
pressures and temperatures to the layers until the plates are welded through 
diffusion. This process eliminates weaknesses associated with traditional joints or 
welds [Aris, 2014, page 12]. 
As part of the European Commission HTGR program, PCHEs have been 
manufactured and tested. A paper focused on the experimental investigation of the 
PCHE mock-up tested on an air test loop [Pra et al, 2008] confirmed the ability of 
this technology to reach High Temperature Reactor heat exchanger requirements in 
terms of thermal duty and pressure loss.  
Efficient heat transfer by the heat exchangers of the AHTR is essential to achieving 
high overall plant thermal efficiency. Although helium has a high thermal 
conductivity relative to other gases, it is still significantly lower than that of water. 
A significant improvement in the effectiveness of helium heat exchangers was 
achieved using a secondary cooling fluid with a higher thermal conductivity and 
lower specific heat such as water or a molten salt [Figley, 2009, page 101]. The 





ingress into the primary system, but also enables the use of existing technology 
related to the storage and ultimate extraction of the thermal energy from the molten 
salt. 
The challenge for the AHTR is to physically accommodate the heat exchangers 
needed to provide the required heat transfer capacity within a compact power 
conversion unit. 
 Based on the number of ongoing HTGR SMR projects being developed in different 
countries [IAEA, 2018(a). page 2] the high temperature helium gas turbine, although 
posing design challenges due to the physical properties of helium and the operating 
conditions, is not perceived by industry to be a significant technical risk. The current 
single crystal turbine blades are considered adequate for traditional HTGR 
temperatures. The AHTR however, due to its desired operating temperature and the 
turbine receiving the helium directly from the reactor, will push the boundaries of 
this research and may require the development of ceramic materials for the turbine. 
The biggest technical uncertainty in the deployment of any new nuclear technology is 
associated with the regulatory and licencing processes. An assessment performed in 2010 
on the US process, estimated the time from start (first application) to finish (licence to 
operate) for the first SMR could be anywhere between 11 to 17 years. For subsequent plants 
based on a certified design, the time could reduce to around 9 years, as the regulatory 
uncertainty would be limited to issues associated with siting [Coyne, 2010, page 34]. In 
contrast to current generation plants, SMRs are designed with passive safety systems and 
features that prevent fuel failure, they therefor require a different approach and methodology 
in their analysis. These methodologies, supporting analysis, and all the technological aspects 
of the plant need to be reviewed independently and accepted by the regulator. Without 
applicable regulatory guidance, industry codes and standards, the risk is on the licence 
applicant to demonstrate acceptance of the methodology, criteria and material properties. 
When applying for a licence in a different country, although the lessons learnt from the 
reviews performed by other regulators can be considered, the process has to be repeated. 
The view from the European utilities perspective is that the long timescales involved in 
licencing and permitting power stations makes it difficult to plan for appropriate long term 





Therefore, it was recommended that the licencing procedures for erecting and operating 
power stations need to be speeded up and simplified [Eurelectric, 2011, page 42]. 
Issues specific to SMRs that require ongoing regulatory attention include things like the 
common control room environment for multi-unit sites, how to define the source term, the 
associated emergency planning requirements and where necessary developing new codes 
and standards that are applicable for the applied technologies [IAEA. 2018(a), page 1]. 
5.2 Economic Considerations and Opportunities 
The main potential of SMRs, based on a summary by the Nuclear Energy Agency [NEA, 
2016, page 65] and the NNR [NNR, 2017], lie in the following factors: 
 The smaller size and the limited need for safety systems should translate to lower 
overnight capital costs, due to less raw material being required. 
 Their small size and the modular design enables them to be built almost completely in 
controlled factory environments, improving the overall level of quality and 
maximising the efficiency through the rapid learning curves associated with series 
production of standardised modules. 
 Modular factory fabrication reduces the scope of the on-site construction activities and 
minimises the time to achieve commercial operation. 
 The standardisation of a module design improves the safety and efficiency through 
standard manufacturing processes and standard operating and maintenance 
procedures.  
 Their small size and scalability makes them suitable for different markets due to the 
variety of deployment options they offer. Their size and passive safety features make 
them an option for regions with smaller grids and limited transmission infrastructure. 
Additional SMR units could be added to a site in the future to accommodate an 
increase in the demand. 
 Multi-unit SMRs, due to their minimal siting requirements, can be built on the same 
site as aging fossil fuel plants that need to be replaced. SMRs are well suited to replace 
aging generating plant due to their flexibility and the improved energy security 






 The low requirement for access to cooling water makes them suitable for remote 
locations and other specific co-generation applications such as desalination or district 
heating. 
 SMRs, like all nuclear reactors, offer a clean, carbon-free thermal energy source. The 
postulated reliability and flexibility offered by SMRs address both energy security and 
climate change objectives. 
The benefits associated with the modularity of construction, the smaller size of each unit, 
the fewer components and a short construction period will reduce the overnight capital costs 
required per unit. This together with the ability to stagger the financial impact of additional 
units is expected to make SMRs easier to finance than large nuclear units. This does not 
necessarily mean that SMRs can directly compete with large nuclear units as the fixed 
operating, maintenance and fuel costs as a function of power level are predicted to be higher 
for SMRs than for large nuclear plants [NEA, 2016, page 21].  
The economic benefits associated with series factory production of the modules are 
important for SMRs to be competitive. The costs to build the modules for the first plant, as 
a once off manufacturing task, will be higher than those for subsequent repeat orders. The 
economic benefit of this learning process in a production factory environment will enable 
the costs to reduce to an optimum NOAK level after a number of plants. This learning 
process that includes possible proof of concept LEAD plants and the predicted reduction in 
the FOAK costs over time to NOAK levels as described by Rosner, Goldberg and Hezir, is 
reflected in Figure 9 [Rosner et al, 2011, page 17]. Although LEAD plants are unlikely to 
be constructed for SMRs, the concept emphasises the significant resource required to 
finalise the standardised design used for a FOAK plant. For example, the NuScale designers 
built a one-third scale, electrically-heated prototype test facility, at Oregon State University 
in Corvallis, Oregon. The information obtained from this and other test facilities has been 







Figure 9 - Levelized cost of learning plants [Rosner et al, 2011] 
An economic analysis of SMRs performed by Boldon and Sabharwall suggests a greater 
reduction between the FOAK and NOAK costs and that the future of small modular reactors 
will ultimately be determined by market competition [Boldon et al, 2014]. The report 
presents scenarios in which SMRs may be made more attractive and competitive compared 
to other load following generation technologies and demonstrates how both storage and 
cogeneration may add to the overall profit margin of an SMR. The analysis estimated the 
LCOE from a SMR to be in the range of 66 to 84 $/MWh, which is similar to the conclusions 
of Rosner and Goldberg. According to the NEA report on the near term deployment of 
SMRs, if the their competitive advantages are achieved, depending on the cost of fossil fuels 
and carbon dioxide emissions costs, SMRs are expected to have a LCOE between those of 
coal and large nuclear plants [NEA, 2016, page 10]. A recent comparison of the LCOE for 
different technologies puts coal in the range of 60 to 103 $/MWh and nuclear between 112 
and 189 $/MWh [Lazard, 2018]. 
Clearly, SMR development takes time and requires significant financial investment to 
achieve FOAK deployment. The financial capability of the vendor and the ability to secure 
a buyer for the FOAK plant is critical for the successful development of any SMR. Many 
SMR initiatives, like the Eskom PBMR, fail to make it past the design phase due to the 
inability to secure additional investment or a buyer for a FOAK plant. The AHTR initiative 
is likely to follow this same route, as Eskom does not have the resources to develop beyond 





The developers of the NuScale design (NuScale Power) have already “secured” an investor 
for the FOAK plant and are planning the deployment of a twelve module plant (720 MWe) 
for  Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems. The plant will be built on the US 
Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratories site near Idaho Falls. The first module 
is expected to be in operation in 2026 and the full plant would be operational by 2027.  
The study by the Nuclear Energy Agency on the market potential for near term deployment 
of SMR concludes that there is a large potential for SMRs. The high-case scenario could 
result in up to 21 GWe of SMR capacity being added globally by 2035. The actual SMR 
market development will strongly depend on the successful deployment of prototypes and 
FOAK plants [NEA, 2016, page 13]. The study also recommends that SMR vendors, 
Governments willing to develop nuclear power, the nuclear industry, manufacturers and 
potential customers need to work together to realise the potential of SMR technology. 
The international media is continuously reporting new initiatives and collaborative 
agreements between different parties and countries associated with SMR technology, 
research initiatives and potential deployment. This demonstrates a continuing global interest 
in the technology and its potential. NuScale Power as an example has signed MOUs with 
energy companies to explore the development, licencing and construction of SMRs in 
Romania, Jordan and Canada. They have also reached agreements with manufacturers, the 
latest being the signing of a MOU with Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction 
Company on 29 April 2019 for cooperation to support the deployment of the NuScale SMR 
worldwide [WNN, 2019]. 
However, most parties are cautious about being the first to invest in a first-of-a-kind 
technology, and want them to be built and tested elsewhere. Until a SMR design has been 
successfully licenced, constructed and operated, the uncertainty associated with the 
licencing of a new technology and the potential for long delays is likely to prevent any large-










The following discussion integrates the pertinent facts established in the previous chapters 
to answer the key research question on the viability of SMRs posed in chapter one. 
The general safety approach of the two SMRs evaluated is to prevent fuel failure by ensuring 
the fuel never exceeds temperatures that could result in fuel failure. This is achieved by 
ensuring a passive means to remove the decay heat from the fuel during all postulated 
conditions. This approach significantly reduces the plant complexity as it eliminates the 
need for the traditional safety systems designed to minimise the amount of fuel failure and 
to prevent the spread of fission products following fuel failure. It is therefore credible for 
the overall safety of modern SMRs to be markedly higher than that of current reactor 
designs. 
The passive heat transfer capability of an SMR is design dependant but is practical due to 
the lower power density in the reactor core. The NuScale design requires the operation of 
valves linking the reactor and containment vessels which allows the evaporation and 
condensation of the coolant to transfer the heat from the fuel to the containment vessel while 
keeping the fuel covered with water. In the AHTR design, the capability to remove the heat 
by thermal convection, conduction and radiation from the core, following a depressurisation 
of the helium cooling circuit, prevents the fuel from exceeding its maximum design 
temperature without any intervention. The large fuel temperature increase required in the 
AHTR to drive the transfer of heat also provides an inherent ability to cope with a failure of 
the control rod system due to the associated large negative reactivity insertion. 
As the two designs are based on PWR and HTGR principles, they benefit from years of 
operating experience and previous regulatory involvement and licencing of the technology. 
Based on this, these SMR should have fewer regulatory hurdles and the design certification 
process should be quicker than for the other SMR types. The choice of technology does 
come with design constraints. For example, the NuScale design has to operate at high 
pressures to prevent the coolant from changing phase and the AHTR has to withstand a loss 





level of maturity eliminate both these design constraints by using coolants such as lead or 
molten salt. SMRs using these coolants could be simpler and safer as they can operate at the 
required high temperatures but at pressures that are at or near atmospheric pressure. 
Inherently safe plants that require no active intervention and can passively shut down from 
any situation are more likely to gain public acceptance.  
The passive cooling capability of a SMR removes all reliance on off-site resources (off site 
electrical supplies, water supplies, etc) during accidents. In addition, the positioning of the 
reactor below ground level makes them significantly less vulnerable to external hazards. 
The improvement in the overall safety through the prevention of fuel failure without the 
reliance on off-site resources significantly reduces the emergency planning requirements. 
These factors make them suitable for deployment in almost any location. 
The modular design enables them to be built almost completely in controlled factory 
environments ensuring a high level of quality. This reduces the scope of the on-site 
construction activities and the time to achieve commercial operation. Design certification 
and efficiency improvements due to the learning curves associated with series production 
of standardised modules, will optimise the overall project duration and reduce the costs for 
subsequent units. Maintaining a standard, certified design reduces the required licencing 
burden for new plants as it would focus primarily on siting issues and provides potential 
investors with confidence that a license for a new plant could be obtained in a reasonable 
time frame. 
Compared to current large nuclear plants, the design of SMRs is simplified by the passive 
safety capability as it eliminates the need for complex safety systems, significantly reducing 
the total number of components. The small unit size and a simple design should translate to 
lower overnight capital costs compared to large nuclear plants, as the costs associated with 
manufacturing and construction are related to the amount of equipment and raw material 
that is required. 
The overall output of a site can be increased as and when needed by adding additional units. 
For a multi-unit SMR site, the staggered commissioning of the individual units would result 
in the earlier generation of revenue stream compared to the construction of a single large 





avoiding periods of site unavailability through the total independence of each unit and the 
staggering of maintenance and refuelling interventions. 
SMRs, like all nuclear plants, are capable of load following and can be designed to comply 
with the applicable grid system requirements on flexibility. Reactor cores are capable of 
providing large operational flexibility especially if the plant design includes regulating 
control rods. The safety analysis of a plant ultimately defines the load following capability 
and the operational limitations, as the analysis has to demonstrate that all the safety criteria 
are respected throughout the complete designed range of operational flexibility. SMRs are 
therefor well suited to offer flexibility for utilities operating in markets with a large share of 
variable renewable generating resources, or operating in small grids with fluctuations in the 
demand. 
Providing operational flexibility comes at a price as the energy a plant produces determines 
the revenue it earns. If a plant does not receive appropriate compensation for the flexibility 
it provides, there will be a load factor below which it is not financially viable. Cogeneration 
can improve the utilisation of an SMR in situations where a high level of flexibility is 
required. 
SMRs have the potential to cogenerate electricity and thermal energy for use in a wide 
variety of industrial applications. The higher the reactor coolant operating temperature, the 
greater the number of potential industrial applications. This was one of the drivers for the 
VHTR and the AHTR concepts as they were initially targeting the production of hydrogen 
that requires temperatures up to 900°C. Even at the lower operating temperatures of the 
NuScale design, studies have demonstrated its viability to support applications such as 
desalination and the oil industry. However, despite the potential benefits of nuclear 
cogeneration, there are challenges that will constrain its deployment. These include the 
existence of a market for both products, the ability to co-site the nuclear and industrial 
facilities, the compatibility of the life spans of both facilities and the impact of the variability 
of each product on the production of the other.  
The storage of thermal energy for future electricity generation, as proposed by the AHTR, 
is an alternate way of improving the load factor. It enables the reactor to operate 
continuously at full power while being able to supply a variable electrical output that 





successfully employed at Concentrated Solar Plants with thermal storage capability. Due to 
their operating temperatures, this storage concept could be applied to liquid metal, molten 
salt or high temperature gas SMRs. The feasibility of this option depends on the cost of 
available alternate energy sources and the cost of increasing the capacity of the SMR and 
operating it at a lower load factor.  
Due to the current established technology base for light water and graphite cooled gas 
reactors, the research that has gone into liquid metal and molten salt reactors, and the 
ongoing development in the different SMR technologies, it would appear that there is no 
technical obstacle preventing any of them from becoming viable, inherently safe, SMR 
designs. The biggest uncertainty in the deployment of SMRs is the time needed for the 
regulatory and licencing processes, as it can only start once the plant design is complete. 
For example, the concept for the NuScale project started in 2003, the design certification 
application was submitted during 2017, final design certification is expected in 2022 and 
the first unit is targeted to be operational in 2026. 
SMRs designs based on an established technology, like the NuScale design that is based on 
PWR technology, require the plant design and the associated safety analysis to be justified 
using existing codes and standards and where necessary, the justification of revised 
methodologies and requirements. The main licencing issues are expected to focus on things 
like how to define the source term, the associated emergency planning requirements and the 
common control room environment for multi-unit sites. This obviously takes time, and until 
the plant design has some level of regulatory approval, it is unlikely to attract investor 
commitment. 
For SMR designs like the AHTR, that push the boundary of the established technology, 
there are additional technical challenges that need to be resolved during the design phase. 
For the AHTR the critical issues revolve around the high operating temperature that is being 
targeted due to the associated efficiency improvement. Examples include the justification 
of the material selection for the turbine blades and the reactor exit structure that will be 
exposed to the proposed high core exit temperatures. From a safety perspective, the analysis 
must demonstrate that there is enough margin between the proposed operating temperature 
and the maximum allowable fuel temperature to accommodate the heat up following a 
potential loss of coolant accident. If, during the design phase, it is concluded that the 





could be reduced to within the range of the existing HTGR experience base and materials 
research. 
The smaller unit size, the significantly fewer components, the modular design and the 
shorter construction period of SMRs will reduce the overnight capital costs required per unit 
if compared with large conventional nuclear units. This lower capital cost per unit, the 
shorter period until a revenue stream is established and the ability to stagger the financial 
impact of additional units is expected to make both individual SMRs and multi-unit SMR 
sites easier to finance than large nuclear units. There is therefore a large potential market 
for SMRs, but the actual SMR deployment will strongly depend on the successful licencing, 
construction and operation of actual plants.  
Due to the costs associated with the development of a FOAK plant, it can be expected that 
some form of government, research or state owned company funding or support, will be 
needed to stimulate the construction of the initial plants. Once successfully demonstrated 
on an operational basis the future of any SMR design will be determined by its unique 
features and market competition. A large factor in the competitiveness of an SMR design 
will be the number of orders placed, as a minimum number will be needed to achieve the 
economic benefit associated with the factory production of the modules. 
The small size and the scalability of SMRs definitely make them viable options for many 
different markets. Their size and safety features make them ideally suited for regions with 
smaller grids and limited transmission infrastructure. In these applications, they have the 
added advantage that over time additional units can be added to the site as demand grows. 
Multi-unit SMRs, due to their flexibility and the improved energy security achievable from 
multiple units, can support grids that have a high percentage of intermittent renewable 
generation. In addition, as a clean source of energy SMRs are well suited to support 
strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and can be used as on-site replacement for 
ageing fossil fuel based energy sources. 
Besides the potential benefits associated with SMR designs, the main disadvantages are 
associated with the licencing uncertainty and the lack of manufacturing, construction and 






SMRs that have safety performance levels far exceeding those of current reactor designs are 
definitely viable and this goal is the driver for the numerous ongoing SMR initiatives. The 
ability to prevent fuel failure through passive cooling simplifies the design by eliminating 
the need for complex safety systems and reduces the constraints associated with siting, 
opening up energy markets where previously nuclear reactors would not have been viable. 
Their flexibility and the ability to add additional units over time enable them to integrate 
into any size electrical network and a variety of energy markets. As a clean energy source, 
SMRs are also well suited to support strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
With these benefits, this preliminary review indicates that SMRs should have an important 
role to play in the future of nuclear energy and further assessment is warranted. The 
deployment of SMRs will be influenced by local market competition, the ability to 
predictably obtain construction and operating licenses in a reasonable time frame from the 
relevant Regulatory Authority and the level of public and government support. Until a SMR 
design has been successfully licenced, constructed and operated, the uncertainty associated 
with the licencing of a new technology and the potential for long delays during construction 
are likely to prevent any large-scale deployment in the near future. As a result, the most 
convincing argument for deployment of SMRs remains the successful demonstration of 
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